Influence of E.E.C. unions on economic policy by Papayannis, Alexander
Lakehead University
Knowledge Commons,http://knowledgecommons.lakeheadu.ca
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Retrospective theses
1986
Influence of E.E.C. unions on economic policy
Papayannis, Alexander
http://knowledgecommons.lakeheadu.ca/handle/2453/925
Downloaded from Lakehead University, KnowledgeCommons
THE INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
TRADE UNIONS ON ECONOMIC POLICY 
Thesis submitted to Lakehead University, Thunder Bay 
Ontario, Canada for the degree of Master of Arts 
by Alexander Papayannis 
ProQuest Number: 10611307 
All rights reserved 
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, 
a note will indicate the deletion. 
ProOuest 
ProQuest 10611307 
Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. 
All rights reserved. 
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code 
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. 
ProQuest LLC. 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346 
Permission has been granted 
to the National Library of 
Canada to microfilm this 
thesis and to lend or sell 
copies of the film. 
The author (copyright owner) 
has reserved other 
publication rights, and 
neither the thesis nor 
extensive extracts from it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without his/her 
written permission. 
L’autorisation a ^te accordee 
S la BibliothSque nationals 
du Canada de microfilmer 
cette thdse et de preter ou 
de vendre des exemplaires du 
f ilm. 
L'auteur (titulaire du droit 
d'auteur) se reserve les 
autres droits de publication; 
ni la th^se ni de longs 
extraits de celle-ci ne 
doivent etre imprimis ou 
autrement reproduits sans son 
autorisation ecrite. 
ISBN 0-3 15-31670-5 
CONTENTS 
Page No. 
INTRODUCTION 
PART ONE 
Historical Background 
The Development of workers' participation 
in the European Economic Community 
France 7 
The Netherlands 12 
De nma r k 15 
Luxembou rg 18 
Belgium 21 
Italy 24 
United Kingdom 2 7 
The Republic of Ireland 30 
We s t Ge rma n y 32 
PART TWO 
Structural Difference Between Trade Unions 
in North America and Europe 
PART THREE 
Worker Influence on economic and social 
policy making 
Employee Participation and Influence • 
the Federal Republic of Germany 
Employee Participation and Influence • 
The Netherlands 
Trade Union Influence in Britain 78 
Worker Participation in the Republic of Ireland 84 
Worker Participation in the European Community 87 
CONCLUSIONS 96 
FOOTNOTES 101 
BIBLlOGRAPHY 1 06 
INTRODUCTION 
The practice of workers' participation the 
decision-making process of management, as well as trade 
union participation in advisory bodies which Influence 
various aspects of government socio-economic policies, has 
long been established in Western Europe. With the 
development of tripartite bodies in the European Economic 
Community CE.E.C.) the influence of trade union 
organisations in the formulation of the Commission's social 
and economic policies has increased as a whole in the last 
two decades, despite the fact that the influence of trade 
unions in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
Kingdom has decreased in the last few years. This happened 
I 
because of the deteriorating relations between the trade 
unions and the conservative governments of those two 
countries, and especially of the latter 
Among the various factors which contribute to the 
establishment and development of any form of workers’ 
participation in management and the trade unions 
participation in tripartite advisory bodies, the attitude of 
all the parties concerned is of vital importance !t ic 
thought essential, therefore, to compare the situation : 
North America and Western Europe concerning 
Iabour-management relations, »n order to understand the 
reasons for the easier acceptance of trade unions as social 
partners of management in the E.E.C. countries. 
The first part of this study explains how trade unions 
were formed in the E.E.C. countries, the legislative 
measures taken by their individual governments in order to 
protect and promote the institution of workers' 
participation in management, and the more recent steps taken 
by some E.E.C. Member States towards workers’ equality 
the socio-economic decision-making or co-decision. 
The second part attempts to Identify the differences 
that exist in the philosophy and attitudes of the parties 
concerned In North America and Western Europe, and 
especially the related progressive legislation and 
n0n-statutory arrangements that have developed among the 
E.E.C. Member States. 
h® third part analyses the experiences or selected 
group of Member States as well as the E.E.C. as a whole 
The analysis supports the thesis that workers' participation 
in management and trade union participation M tripartite 
advisory bodies do in fact, not only reduce conflict and 
increase prod u c tivity, but they also influence considerably 
socio-economic policies and improved standards of work and 
I V I n g . 
A variety of research methods were employed to gather 
the material for this study, and I am grateful 
people who have assisted me, including a number of o 
of the E.E.C. in Brussels, and of the German, Irish, 
and Dutch Governments. 
Special thanks are due to Professor Chris Jecch 
the Department of Economics, Lakehead University 
advice, suggestions, kindness and patience have 
constant source of help and encouragement 
t o ma n y 
f i c i a I s 
B r i t i s h 
n i s o I 
whose 
been 
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PART 1 
Historical Background 
The European Economic Community 
today, was founded in 1957 by the 
countries: West Germany (F.R.G.), 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium. 
C E . E . C) 
six or 
France 
a s we 
g i n a I 
I t a 
know it 
member 
y , the 
Long before 1957, in some countries as early as the 
twenties, European trade unions had been striving for 
recognition and acceptance, by employers and government 
alike, as social partners in concerted efforts to improve 
social and economic conditions. Traditional acceptance of 
trade unions in Western Europe was strengthened in the post 
World War '! period, because governments and employer 
organizations recognized the need of securing the 
co-operation of trade unions in the effort to reconstruct 
their economies and individual industries from the ravages 
of war This effort was directed towards improved 
productivity performance in order to meet more effectively 
international competition, especially from North America. 
On the other hand, the trade unions accepted their dual role 
as representative organizations of workers In the various 
sectors of the economy, and at the same time as participants 
in institutional arrangements which allowed them to 
influence decisions affecting social and economic policies 
at three different levels namely those of the plant or 
-2- 
industry, of the respective nations and later, once 
established, of the European Economic Community itself The 
political power of Western European unions acquired through 
their association with political parties, especially with 
the socialist parties (which formed governments or 
coalitions in the post World War II period), has given more 
impetus to trade union participation in bipartite Cie. 
employee employer) and tripartite (employee • employer 
government) bodies of an advisory or co-decision nature. 
The term 'worker participation' is confusing by itself 
and, in order to shed some light on the issue, it must be 
defined. Worker participation deals with the participation 
of workers in the management of the enterprise It can be 
of Q limited form, such as participation at the factory 
floor level, or of a more advanced form such as 
participation at the plant level or the corporate level 
Therefore workers through their elected representatives or 
delegates can influence the decision-making process at the 
three levels of hierarchy. This influence can range from 
work methods and safety regulations to policy decisions such 
as pricing and marketing policies, setting goals and 
objectives for the company, etc. 
A table complied by H. Jain presents an analytical 
division of the three levels of hierarchy (ie. shop-floor 
level, plant level, corporate level) and the nature of the 
decisions taken at each level:' 
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Participants IM management and supervisor 
include worker representatives who are elected 
workers at the top level of management, namely to 
of directors, and whose function is to partic 
policy-making, as well as in the administrati 
enterprise. This type of workers'participation 
explained in detail in a following chapter, as the 
exerted by the worker representatives is rather int 
y boards 
by the 
the board 
i p a t e in 
on of the 
will be 
influence 
e r e s t i n g . 
Joint-consultation is another type of employee-employer 
relationship, and the elected employee delegates represent 
the workers in various I abour-managernent committees The 
function of these co mmittees or councils is to enable both 
interested parties to exchange ideas concerning production, 
safety, welfare of the workers, etc. and to allow employees 
to influence managerial decisions. 
A third type of workers' 
collective bargaining, a 
working conditions, safety 
bargaining can be reached 
negotiations between the two 
the above Issues. 
participation in management 
process which affects wages, 
regulations, etc. Collective 
usually after a long process of 
interested parties regarding 
Finally, a fourth type of participation with day-to-day 
issues concerning both sides, is participation at the shop 
floor level. Workers and management representatives discuss 
such issues as working conditions, production problems, new 
Job designs, methods of work, etc. and make suggestions for 
-6- 
jmprovements or changes 
The simplest definition of worker participation is the 
participation of workers through their representatives in 
the decision-making process of the enterprise. In most West 
European countries, the governments play a very Important 
role in Iabour-management relations aiming to reduce 
conflict, increase productivity, promote co-operation 
between the two parties, and consequently promote industrial 
democracy. The West German model of co-determination is a 
very good example of a three party participation and will be 
discussed later in detail. 
As mentioned earlier, the close political ties between 
labour unions and certain governing parties in Western 
Europe influence government policies and the resulting 
pro-labour legislation. Direct government intervention In 
most We stern European countries has steadily increased since 
the middle fifties and, as a result, new guidelines for wage 
and price controls, minimum wages, hours of work, health and 
safety regulations have been set 
Thus, trade unions 
participate as equal 
micro-economic decisions 
management and government 
national level, and even 
have acquired 
partners with 
as well as 
in macro-economi 
a t 
the right 
ma n a g erne n t 
partners with 
c decisions at the 
the European Economic Community 
level . 
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The Development of workers* participation in The European 
Economic Community 
Although industrial democracy is nothing new in Western 
Europe and the first steps towards that goal were taken 
immediately after the last war, the most spectacular changes 
took place in the late sixties and early seventies. 
Traditional values and the status quo were being 
increasingly questioned and challenged, and the belief that 
an educated and satisfied workforce is more productive had 
already matured. 
Workers' participation originated in the early twenties 
and was the result of a long search for social justice and 
better working conditions, more humane methods and policies, 
etc. The 1920 Works’ Council Act of the Weimar Republic of 
Germany, was the first significant step forward, which 
resulted in workers' representation on the supervisory 
boards of enterprises.a Similarly, but much later C1945), in 
France, the need for a spirit of co-operation between the 
parties concerned is present in the Ordinance of February 
1945 which declares that the committees in the enterprises 
"must be, above all, the sign of the fruitful union of alt 
elements of production, to return to France its prosperity 
and greatness".® 
The main interest of most countries was the resurrection 
and reorganization of their industries from the destruction 
-7- 
of the war. However, the most startling changes took place 
in the early seventies. In Belgium, the 1973 Decree 
recognized the rijghts of works' councils to information 
I 
concerning industrial policy. In West Germany, works' 
councils largely benefited from the 1972 Act Denmark and 
Italy both saw rapid progress concerning employee 
participation in 1970. In Austria and France, the powers of 
the works’ councils were strengthened in 1973, as they were 
in the Netherlands in 1971, Luxembourg in 1974, Norway in 
1966 and again in 1969, Sweden in 1976, the United Kingdom 
in 1974 and so on. 
The European Economic Commu nity, following the major 
changes in industrial democracy which took place in the 
individual member-states, issued the European Company 
Statute in 1970 and later the Fifth Directive in 1972, both 
of them designed to promote employee participation i- 
European companies, and the promotion of industrial 
democracy. Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark joined 
the E.E.C. later that year and a new revised proposed 
Directive was issued in 1975 which advocated and encouraged 
such institutional arrangements as employee participation in 
the decision-making at the plant level, and board level, of 
the works' council type. 
France 
Although French trade unions refused consistently to 
coincide their interests with those of the employers. 
-8- 
industrial disputes since 1968 have been very few. The two 
major union confederations the CGT and the CFDT represent 
almost a quarter of the work force in France, which is a low 
figure compared to the other Western European countries. 
Under French legislation, representation of the 
in individual enterprises has existed since 1936. 
councils were established in 1945, and the strikes 
brought about an improvement in union representat 
well as a stronger union voice. 
workers 
Works' 
of 1968 
ion, as 
Union 
enterprises 
Enterprises 
wo rks' counc 
workers. 
representatives are elected annually in all 
which employ more than ten employees 
employing more than 50 workers must set up a 
il which includes delegates elected by the 
Participation through the collective bargaining process 
is a rather complicated mechanism because of certain 
peculiarities in the French system. Most employers are 
members of an employer’s organisation, the CNPF which 
represents more than a million firms employing almost 
three-quarters of the total labour force. Collective 
bargaining, between the national employers' organisation and 
the five national union confederations, is a widespread 
instrument which reduces industrial conflict, although state 
intervention is a rather traditional phenomenon. Both sides 
are often involved in tripartite talks which usually include 
various government departments. Because of the strength of 
-9- 
both employers and unions, there are always pressures for 
legislation or pressures on the government. From 1950 to 
1968 collective bargaining (either at national or regional 
level), was the most widely used tool.'* After 1 968 however, 
multi-industrial bargaining involving cluster of 
individual enterprises, seems to be the norm. This type of 
bargaining which takes place at the national level, includes 
issues such as: vocational training, unemployment pay, 
r edundancy, etc. 
Collective bargaining also takes place at the plant 
level, involving only an individual firm and the union 
representing the employees of the establishment, but usually 
the unions are rather weak in all but a few large 
enterprises. Therefore, the French system incorporates 
bipartite and tripartite bargaining at the firm level and 
the national level respectively. 
The Sudreau Report of 
negotiations between the parti 
that unions should be given st 
1975 recommends more open 
es concerned, and advocates 
ronger powers to negotiate. 
The Ordinance of February 1946 introduced a new concept 
of consultation, that of the enterprise committee (comite 
d'enteprise). The enterprise committee is a purely 
consultative body regulating individual workers' production 
c ommit t e e s. 
Under the law of 1966, these enterprise committees are 
- 10- 
mandatory in all establishments employing more than 50 
persons. In the case of multi-plant firms, a central 
committee exists to supervise and regulate the powers of 
individual plant committees. These councils, which are 
chaired by the employer, (all other members are employee 
representatives), must be informed about the running of the 
firm, conditions which affect employment, financial 
information, future plans, sales, investments, etc. A law 
passed in January 1976 provides for the consultation of 
employee delegates on matters related to redundancies and 
dismissals for economic reasons. Other issues concerning 
personnel matters such as working hours, holidays, job 
security, work methods, health and safety, etc. must also 
be discussed in committee meetings. Since December 1968 a 
new law, which was passed after the labour uprising of 1968, 
provides for union representation in firms employing more 
than 60 persons, by means of union delegates within the 
individual firms. This union branch Csection syndicale) 
consists of union representatives which defend the interests 
of the workers in the establishment. 
Employee participation on the boards of directors of 
private and public enterprises is different in France. 
Representation In the private sector is rather weak and^only 
5 small minority of companies include such a scheme. The 
case of the public sector however, is somewhat different 
Here, public companies CSoci6t6s Anonymes) which employ more 
than 50 persons allow two delegates from the works' councils 
to participate in the boards of directors or the supervisory 
-11- 
boards, but their function is purely consultative. 
Supervisory boards in the public sector are of tripartite 
nature involving the government, the employees and the 
managers of the enterprise. Employee participation differs 
from one enterprise to another, according to the nature of 
the firm. Thus, in mining, the railways and other 
industries, employee participants are appointed by the 
strongest unions. In the national airline. Air France, they 
are appointed by all employees, whereas at Renault Cthe 
national car manufacturer) they are appointed by the firm’s 
C ommittee.® in ail cases mentioned above, employee 
participants have the same voting rights as the other 
members of the board. 
France has a profit-sharing system which 
to 1967. After that time, it became obli 
companies employing 100 people or more 
passed in 1973, made profit-sharing obli 
companies employing more than 50 employees. 
was optional up 
gatory for all 
A new amendmen t, 
gatory for all 
Under this scheme, firms are required to deposit a 
certain amount of the company profit in a special fund. 
Shares in the fund are distributed to the employees of the 
establishment according to seniority, salary, etc. after a 
minimum period of five years. This fund is tax-free, and 
the company is allowed to make tax-free investments of equal 
magnitude to the amount deposited in the fund 
Union representation individual firms has risen 
- 12- 
dramatically from 46% in 1975 to 96% in companies employing 
1000 persons.* The Sudreau Report which was introduced in 
1976, advocates the extension of collective bargaining and 
the strengthening of the role of the enterprise committee. 
Other reforms advocated by the report, include 
co-supervision on all firms employing more than 2000 
employees. Co-supervIsion intends to give workers through 
their delegates, full voting rights on the board of 
directors or the supervisory board, as well as more 
information on the financial and operating scheme of the 
enterprise. Employee participation calls for one-third of 
the total number of seats within the supervisory board, so 
that the managerial decision-making process will not be 
a I t e r ed . 
The Netherlands 
This country is characterized by its good industrial 
relations, and the commitment to co-operation between the 
government and industry'. 
In January 1976, the Netherlands Confederation Trade 
Union Movement (FNV) was formed, which consisted of three 
major confederations: the Social Democratic CNVV), the 
Catholic CNKV3, the Protestant CCNV) and a few smaller ones 
representing both white and blue-collar workers. 
Employers are also organized under a confederation, The 
Federation of Netherlands Industry CVNO), although there are 
-13- 
other confederations as well, such as the Netherlands 
Christian Employers Federation CNCW) etc. 
Under Dutch law collective bargaining is mandatory ai 
both national and company level In 1945 the Foundation of 
Labour was formed, a bipartite body, whose function is to 
bring representatives of employees and employers together to 
discuss current affairs at the national level. 
The works' council in the Netherlands was founded in 
1950 by a law which was amended in 1971 extending its 
functions. Under Dutch law, any establishment employing 100 
workers or more, must have a works' council There are 
works' councils at the plant level, the company level, as 
well as the national level, where union delegates represent 
the rights of the employees. Small firms employing from 25 
to 60 employees must have at least three employee 
representatives in their works' council whereas larger ones 
(up to 12,000 employees), include up to 26 worker 
representatives in their works' councils. 
The works' councils have certain rights such as the 
right to information on the running of the firm, 
consultation on transfer of ownership or closure, training, 
recruitment, etc. They also participate in meetings which 
deal with hours of work, holidays, pensions, safety and 
health, profit sharing, etc. 
Dutch trade unions feel that the functions and the power 
- 1 4- 
of the works' councils 
well, especially the 
re-examination of the 
currently under way. 
should be extended in other areas as 
power of co-determination. 
nstitutlon of the works' councils is 
Finally, a bill which was passed in 1976 proposes that 
the works' councils should be composed of employee 
representatives only, as in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and should consult with management on a regular basis 
Under the 1971 act, worker representation at the board 
level is provided, especially in firms employing more than 
100 persons (excluding overseas operations) and showing 
capital reserves of at least 10 million guilders. The same 
act provides a clause which deals with the functions of both 
sides at the supervisory board, and is so designed as to 
ensure a balance between employees and employers on the 
board. Thus, the works' council or the general meeting can 
oppose the appointment of a member they feel unsuitable, and 
the matter can be carried further to the Social-Economic 
Council CSER) which has the power to rule whether the 
objection is valid or not. The role of the SER will be 
explained later in another chapter devoted to the 
Netherlands. 
The public sector is similar to the private sector i 
the sense that works' councils and supervisory boards also 
exist, and employee participation is encouraged by the 
government. 
- 15- 
Profit-sharing is also a function of Dutch industry, and 
the bill of 1976 proposes a fund which consists of 10-12% of 
the company profits, which will pay retirement pensions to 
company employees. Under this bill union representatives 
should administer the fund and also distribute to the 
employees part of the fund in the form of shares and capital 
growth certificates. 
As was mentioned earlier, future prospects for employee 
participation are rather promising. The Dutch Government 
Intends to extend the p owe r of the wo rks' councils, and 
remove management representatives from the council In order 
to preserve the contact and consultation procedures between 
the managers and the managed, it is proposed that additional 
joint consultative meetings be held on a regular basis, at 
least every two months. !t is also recommended that works' 
councils should be given advisory powers Caccording to the 
E.E.C. proposed directive) on the rights of workers in cases 
of takeovers, mergers, or investment decisions which affect 
the employees of the establishment. 
Denmark 
D e nma r k has a 
which dates back to 
Danish EmpIo ye r s' 
Federation of Trade 
their memb e r s and 
centralized collective bargaining system 
1899. The two parties involved, the 
Confederation CDA) and the Danish 
Unions (LO) both exercise influence on 
are responsible for negotiations at the 
national level 
- 16- 
The issues negotiated between the two parties include 
welfare and safety, minimum rates of pay, insurance 
benefits, holidays, etc. Agreements reached by the two 
sides are legally binding for two years, and in the event of 
conflict the Minister of Labour appoints mediators who 
examine the issues at hand and have the authority to suspend 
any strikes until an agreement is reached. 
t is interesting to note that 70% of the working 
population belong to trade unions, because the non-unionized 
receive less social security from the State in the case of 
unemployment Unions which are quite strong in Denmark can 
offer higher social security for their members and better 
fringe benefits. Towards the end of 1970, the Employers' 
Federation and the Federation of Trade Unions reached an 
agreement which provides for the organization of 
co-operative committees in firms employing 50 persons or 
more. These committees, which are established i' the 
employer or employees request them, are composed by an equal 
number of representatives from both sides including the 
supervisory staff The members of the committee serve for 
two years with the possibility of re-election. 
The role of these co-operative committees is to ensure 
and preserve the rights of both sides, such as the right to 
information, the right of co-determination and co-influence 
and all matters pertinent to satisfactory working 
conditions. Items such as information relating to the 
financial situation of the firm and the future prospects, 
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must be available for the committee as they are available 
for the shareholders. The management must put forward 
general suggestions about the company policy, which is 
discussed, and the employee representatives must be 
consulted on any changes. The committee has also 
co-determination rights on the policy affecting employees in 
the establishment, and other matters concerning employment, 
safety and personnel. 
Employee participation at the board level is ensured by 
two acts which were introduced in 1973. All enterprises 
employing 60 persons or more must have a supervisory board 
of directors, with at least two employee representatives 
participating. A company can appoint more than two worker 
representatives if it chooses to do so, but the majority of 
members must be elected by the shareholders' general 
meeting. The chairman of the board may not be a manager of 
the company. Employee representatives, who are elected for 
two years in office from company employees who are at least 
one year with the company, have the same rights as any other 
board membe r. 
Profit-sharing schemes have also been present in Denmark 
on a voluntary basis since 1957. In 1973 the Social 
Democratic Government proposed a Bill for compulsory 
profit-sharing funds for employees, but the Employers 
Federation reacted with vigour against it, and the 
resignation of the government in December of 1973 put an end 
to the proposal. Since 1973 there has been no move for a 
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new bill concerning compulsory profit-sharing but 
expected in the near future. 
The acts of 1973 which gave more power to the trade 
unions appear unlikely to be changed for the time being. 
Wo rker representatives on the board of directors now enjoy 
more rights and access to more information on the running of 
their company, as well as a stronger voice on the 
decision-making process at their work place. 
Lux emb o u r q 
Collective bargaining in Luxembourg is the predominant 
tool to settle industrial disputes. 
law, introduced in June 1965, made collective 
bargaining obligatory for employers who have to deal with 
several unions individually, or in organized groups such as 
the Federation of Employers (F6d6ration d'EmpIoyeurs) 
Collective agreements are binding for both parties 
concerned, with a duration ranging from six months to three 
years. Evidence suggests that Luxembourg has enjoyed 
industrial peace for 25 years.® 
Representation and consultative procedures are made 
possible by means of two institutional arrangements: the 
joint committees, and workers' delegations. 
The former arrangement was introduced in 1974 by law, 
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and its nature Is primarily consultative with some powers of 
supervision and policy-making. Joint committees consist of 
equal numbers of representatives from both sides and are 
obligatory for all firms employing 150 persons or more. 
The chairman of the committee ■ the chief executive 
must inform the committee every six months on such matters 
as the financial situation of the enterprise, level of 
employment, investment and production levels, etc. 
Moreover, the committee must be consulted on issues such as 
changes in work methods and rules, manpower and training 
schemes, shop rules, and any changes which affect 
production. 
The decision-making powers of the joint comm I 
include health and safety requirements, measures concer 
the behaviour of workers in the establishment, promo 
transfers and, finally, dismissal of employees. They 
also supervise the administration of the firm's wel 
facilities. In the case where a stalemate is reached 
both sides, the case can be taken to the Nati 
Conciliation Office. 
t t e e 
n i n g 
t i 0 n 
can 
fare 
by 
o n a I 
The second method of 
consuI tat ion 
Cd6l6gu^s du 
defend the 
procedures 
personne I ) 
rights and 
institutionalized information and 
consists of workers' delegations 
whose functions are to ensure and 
interests of the employees in social 
matters. 
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After World War I, workers’ delegations were established 
by a law which was amended In 1962. 
All private enterprises are obliged to allow the 
formation of such a body, and in the case of public firms, 
personnel delegates are elected by the employees of any 
establishment employing 15 workers or more. Finally, 
workers' delegations function in the same way as the joint 
c ommi t t e e s . 
Employee participation at the board level of public 
companies was introduced In 1974. The law of 1974 provides 
for such an arrangement for all public companies with 1000 
employees or, companies where the state holds at least 25% 
of the capital or, those which hold a state concession for 
their principal activities. 
in the first case, employee representatives 
one-third of the seats on the board of directors; 
second and third cases, workers hold up to one-third 
seats on the board with a minimum of three seats. 
hold 
in the 
of the 
Although unions are in favour of equal representat 
the board level, it seems likely that the one 
representation will remain for the foreseeable future 
benefits incurred by this representation have I 
contributed to industrial peace which this countr 
enjoyed for so long. On the other hand, employers 
ion at 
- t h i r d 
The 
a r g e I y 
y has 
argue 
that industrial relations were excellent even before the 
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1974 law and that little has changed since • 
impI erne n t a t io n. 
Belgium 
Since World War the Belgian industrial relations 
system has been characterized by good relations between the 
employers and employees. Its high level of organisation has 
contributed to this, resulting in a close collaboration 
between the two sides concerned. However, many fear that 
this collaboration will not last and predict that, 
throughout the 1980's industrial relations will decline. 
Collective bargaining is a dominant tool in the Belgian 
industrial system, with negotiations taking place at the 
plant level, industry level, and national level The 
Employers' Federation (FEFB) and the three main unions, the 
Christian Democractic CCSC), the Socialist CFGTB) and the 
Liberal (CGSLB), are the protagonists of all collective 
bargaining schemes. Although collective bargaining at the 
Industry level seems to be the most dominant, negotiations 
at the national level have taken place more frequently since 
the early seventies. 
Some of the issues negotiated at the national level 
include pensions, holidays, works' councils, etc. The 
National Council of Labour (CNT) Is also active here, 
representing employers and employees in equal numbers, and 
being responsible for agreements such as minimum pay for 
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disabled workers. 
At the Industry level, employees are active in 
negotiations concerning works’ councils, safety and health 
etc. through various committees. 
The works' council, founded in 1948, is a joint body 
chaired by the head of the enterprise and consists of 
delegates from the management and union. Works' councils 
exist in both the private and public sectors such as in 
hospitals, educational institutions, etc. In the private 
sector, ail enterprises employing 150 persons are obliged by 
law to incorporate a works' council within their 
establishment, where the employer representatives cannot 
outnumber worker representatives. All information 
concerning the economic and financial situation of the firm 
must be supplied to the council which must be consulted for 
any changes affecting conditions of employment, hiring and 
firing procedures, the structure of productions, etc. 
For smaller firms employing 60 persons or more, various 
committees such as health and safety committees, working 
environment committees etc. act as works' councils. 
Union representation is also obligatory for all firms 
employing 20 workers or more who have a say on matters 
affecting changes In pay rates and conditions of employment 
The concept of union delegation within the firm was 
established in 1947 and union representatives deal with 
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negotiatlons at the plant level, their roles being somewhat 
similar to those of the shop steward. 
Workers' participation at a higher level, namely at the 
board of directors, has not yet been achieved in Belgium. 
With the exception of some public enterprises where there Is 
a form of participation, the private sector remains without 
workers' representatives on the boards of the enterprises. 
The Belgian Railroads, the national airline Sabena, and the 
Brussels Public Transport Company have allowed a small 
number of employee representatives onto their board of 
directors. In particular, the railroads include three worker 
representatives among the 21 members of their Board of 
Dl rectors.® 
Although the unions are pressing the government to give 
them a more decisive role in the private industries, 
particularly in large industries, there is no provision yet 
for such a thing. The Belgian trade unions support the 
proposals for participation as submitted by the E.E.C. 
Company Statute, although the Socialist Union CFGTB) is 
somewhat more militant in its demands for workers' control 
taking power out of management and placing it in the hands 
of the workers. They disagree with the other unions that 
co-determination is the best solution, because they feel i‘ 
does not really give workers any real powers. 
Finally, the Belgian General Federation of Labour is 
presently considering an increase in the powers of worker 
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representatives within the works’ councils, giving them more 
consultative as well as supervisory functions. 
Italy 
The industrial relations system in Italy not yet 
stable partly because of rapid industrialization after World 
War II, and partly due to the political and ideological 
differences between the six main organisations. 
The three main unions are the Communist dominated 
organisation CCGIL) with four million members, the Christian 
organisation CCISL) with 2.5 million members and the 
Socialist Republican (UIL) with 760,000 members. There are 
also two non-political organisations and a neo-fascist trade 
union, which is boycotted by the other union organisations. 
On the employers side there are four main employers' 
confederations, the Industrial Employers Federation (private 
industry), the Public and Semi-public Employers’ Federation, 
the Agricultural Employers’ Federation, and finally the 
Commerical Employers' Organisation. 
Both sides participate in collective bargaining at 
national. Industry, and plant level Each of the major 
union and employers' confederations are responsible for 
negotiations at the national level, while negotiations at 
the industry level are more common including issues such as 
basic rate of pay and conditions of employment Plant level 
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agreements became more important in the early sixties, at 
first covering only productivity bonus issues, but lately 
having expanded gradually to cover wider scopes. 
Union representatives, forming factory councils, have 
managed to exercise their power to negotiate collective 
agreements and to resolve differences at plant level, over 
such wide issues as internal transfers and promotions, 
organisation of work, vocational training, pay levels, etc. 
In some large industries where participation and 
Intervention Is of a higher degree, plant level agreements 
cover principles which are generally included in national 
a g r e erne n t s . 
Since 1969, national agreements have included work 
allocation, welfare, levels of employment, etc. the unions 
having a strong voice on the issues being negotiated. With 
the increase in union power, the government has frequently 
been involved in discussions on econ omic policy and the 
influence exerted by the unions on the government has tended 
to direct guidelines concerning public policy. 
Information and consultation 
main bodies, namely the internal 
bodies and the works' councils. 
procedures involve three 
committees, the union 
The internal committees, which lost some of their 
importance after 1966, are peculiar to the Italian social 
system and are mainly to implement national agreements 
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within the enterprise, as well as to ensure the enforcement 
of health and safety laws, working hours, holidays, shifts 
and handling grievances. The elected member of the internal 
committees represent the workers of the enterprise in order 
to maintain and promote co-operation between management and 
t he managed. 
Unions were established with the statute on workers' 
rights and, according to this statute, all employers are 
obliged to recognize and allow the organisation of unions 
within their plants as well as to negotiate with their 
elected representatives. 
Union representatives, with the co-operation 
non-union elected representatives, participate in factory 
councils which function In the same way as works' councils. 
This form of participation came about in 1969 after the 
union struggles of 1968-69. 
The delegates are all elected by an homogeneous group of 
workers based on production or occupational categories, and 
all employees of that particular group have the right to 
vote for their representatives whether or not they are union 
members. The elected delegates then act as a works' council 
authorized to conduct negotiations with the management of 
the establishment. The issues negotiated by the works' 
council are personnel policy, training, transfers, 
promotions, wage claims, and organisation of production. 
Although employers did not favour the organisation of 
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factory councils, these councils became the backbone of the 
industrial relations system in the Italian economy. In 
particular, factory councils of large enterprises have a 
wider scope of functions, becoming involved in the 
implementation of national agreements. For the time being, 
there are no provisions for worker participation on the 
board of directors in the private sector, nor in the public 
sector with the exception of a few isolated public companies 
such as the National Board for Electrical Emergency which 
allows some workers to sit on the supervisory board. 
Unions have been pressing since the mid-seventies for 
more participation and a stronger say on economic policy, 
especially on investment and production policies which 
affect their members. There has been a move towards that 
direction, and, if union demands are met, factory committees 
and industrial unions will Influence public policy a great 
deal more than at the present time. 
United Kingdom 
Employee participation at board level is 
the United Kingdom contrary to most countries 
Europe, and collective bargaining is the main 
influence over the decision-making process. 
very rare in 
of Continental 
tool for union 
The Trade Union Congress CTUC) which consists of the 
various Industrial, occupational and craft unions in the 
United Kingdom, represents more than 600 of such unions and 
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thus the vast majority of the unionised work force. About 
50% of the work force belong to unions and through the TUC 
they can participate in the collective bargaining process. 
The conditions of all bargaining procedures are not binding 
on the member unions of the TUC and its role is more of an 
advisory one. Although collective bargaining takes place at 
the industry, company, or plant level, lately there has been 
trend for collective bargaining at the enterprise or even 
the plant level covering a broad scope of issues such as 
training, productivity, welfare, safety, etc. Issues such 
as investment policy, mergers, closures, etc. are not 
usually covered in collective bargaining agreements. 
Collective bargaining gradually became more important 
since the early fifties, especially between the managers and 
the workers in the manufacturing sector. The peculiarity of 
the British system is that the shop steward is the union 
official most involved in industrial relations and 
particularly collective bargaining, and in some cases shop 
stewards play the role of the works' council 
The government has recognized the role of collective 
bargaining and through the Employment Protection Act of 1975 
it has given unions the right to appeal to the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Service in the case where the employer does 
not recognize the union. Moreover, employers are obliged 
under the same Act to give all pertinent information to the 
unions which can be used to make collective bargaining 
effective. Finally, the Act of 1975 recognizes tripartite 
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co-operation 
negot iations 
contracts. 
and the involvement oi employees 
between an enterprise and the government for 
European-type works’ councils do not exist in the United 
Kingdom, although there is a system of joint consultation 
which is closely linked to the collective bargaining 
procedure. Such joint consultation committees include an 
equal number of employee representatives and employer 
nominated representatives. The function of such committees 
is to be consulted on matters regarding productivity, 
personnel, safety and welfare, etc. 
Employee participation on the board of directors io 
rather rare in the United Kingdom. However, there Is some 
participation on the board of directors in nationalized 
industries such as the British Steel Corporation where the 
government appoints a small number of union representatives 
with a consultative role but little control over policy. The 
Bullock Commission which undertook a study on the question 
of employee participation in the public and private sector, 
made its findings known in 1977 and the government intends 
to announce its intentions on that matter in the near 
future. It Is expected that employee participation will be 
introduced soon especially after recommendations made by the 
E.E.C . 
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
employers' organisation in the United Kingdom, 
which is 
ob j e c t s 
t h e 
t n 
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employee participation of the European type stressing that 
the British industrial relations system is different in 
their country but have instead other forms of employee 
participation more flexible and particular to the individual 
Industries. 
Republic of Ireland 
Employee participation at board level is not the main 
way in which unions influence decision making. !t '* 
limited to the public sector only and collective bargaining 
is the most effective tool for union power over economic 
decision making in Ireland. 
Although the Irish industrial relations system 
similar to the British system, collective bargaining plays a 
more important role In Ireland than in the United Kingdom. 
Collective bargaining can take place at either level namely 
the plant, local or national level, but since 1970 there has 
been a tendency for negotiations to take place at the 
national level. Especially negotiations which take place at 
the Employer-Labour Conference with the government 
participating, are of national importance with the 
government acting as the major national employer Issues 
negotiated at the Conference usually include pay incrases, 
productivity, terms of employment etc. Under the Union Acts 
of 1941 and 1971 only union bodies holding a Ministry of 
Labour licence are authorized to participate in tripartite 
negotiations. Collective bargaining also takes place as was 
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mentioned earlier, at the plant or enterprise level, where 
issues such as training, recruitment, redundancy, etc. are 
n e g 0 t i a t e d . 
Works' councils are not widespread in industrial 
Ireland, although some of them function in the private 
sector and are the result of a combined agreement between 
management and unions of that particular enterprise. 
Estimates show that about one half of the firms employing 
more than 500 persons, and about a third of those employing 
between 100-500 persons have works' counci Is.''® As in other 
European countries these bodies provide parity 
representation between the employees and the employers with 
a management representative chairing the works' council 
Works' councils have a consultative and advisory function 
but cannot affect Industrial or firm policy. Some 
exceptions can be found in firms where unions are strong and 
can influence collective bargaining effectively. 
On the other hand, consultation on safety issues is 
legally required under the Factory Act of 1965, and safety 
committees exist for consultation, a move which is hailed by 
unions as a positive step forward. 
A sub-committee of the empIoyers-workers consultative 
body made recommendations in 1973 about the creation of 
works’ councils in all firms employing more than 25 persons 
and it seems probable that such bodies will start to make 
their appearance shortly in all industrial establishments. 
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Worker representation at the board level, although not 
Illegal in Ireland, Is rather rare and found only in 
isolated establishments of the public sector, where 
individual union representatives participate in board 
meetings. The government intends to increase worker 
participation in a number of nationalized industries in the 
near future. These government proposals which were 
published in 1975, have as a goal a one-third representation 
by workers' representatives who will be elected by secret 
ballot. By encouraging employee participation in the public 
sector the government hopes that private enterprises will 
follow suit in order to Improve industrial relations. and 
particularly to increase productivity. The Irish Congress 
of Trade Unions CICTU) agrees to the proposals of the 
European Commission as contained within the European company 
statute concerning works' councils, but wants worker 
representatives elected through union machinery within the 
individual firms. 
West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) 
The West German model of industrial relations is rather 
unique. The socio-economic reforms which started in this 
country earlier than other European countries gave to the 
working population both a 'saying' through co-determination 
and a 'having' through capital sharing.’** These two freedoms 
enjoyed by workers in private industry contributed to the 
economic miracle of West Germany, resulting in a better than 
normal industrial relations system which kept West Germany 
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sheltered during the recent recession. 
Trade unions in West Germany date back to 1860 when the 
first industrial unions were formed. Soon it became evident 
that more freedom for the workers would result in better 
productivity performance and, most importantly, industrial 
democracy. During the Weimar Republic in 1918, works' 
councils were introduced at plant, regional and national 
levels. In 1920, these works’ councils were established by 
law, and in 1945 worker participation in company supervisory 
boards came into existence. This worker participation in 
the running of a company, also known as co-determination, 
gave the workers a strong voice in matters affecting them as 
well as a strong influence on company policy. 
Collective bargaining was introduced during the Weimar 
period and applies to all workers in a given sector on r 
regional basis. Rarely do collective agreements cover 
several regions or the whole Republic. It still is c 
widespread method for solving disputes in individual 
establishments as well as a means of negotiating wage 
increases and welfare. 
Works' councils, which were established in 1920, reached 
their modern form through the Works’ Constitution Act of 
1952. The new Act of 1972 strengthened the industrial 
unions of West Germany and gave works’ councils a greater 
influence on company policy, especially personnel policy. 
According to the 1972 Act all establishments employing more 
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than five employeee must allow the formation of a works' 
council and where a firm owns several plants there is a 
provision for a central works' council co-ordinating the 
various works' councils operating in each plant Four times 
a year every works' council consults with the employer to 
solve disputes and in the case of a dead-lock in the 
negotiations, the issue is taken to a labour court or an 
arbitration body whose decision is binding for both sides 
Works' councils have the right to co-determination, (see 
Table 2), consultation, and information. They have the 
right to participate in personnel matters and must be 
supplied with all necessary information by the employer 
Moreover, all matters affecting hiring, firing, transfers of 
employees, etc., must be presented to the works' council for 
consultation. 
On issues affecting co-determination, all managerial 
decisions must be brought up for works' council approval 
!' there is a disagreement between the two sides, then the 
issue goes to the arbitration committee for a decision. 
Co-determination affects many issues including personnel 
policies, economic issues, working hours, holidays, health 
and safety, promotion, dismissal, hiring, etc. Furthermore, 
mergers, acquisitions, close-down of the firm, are subject 
to co-determination and must be brought up to the works' 
councils before a decision can be taken. In companies 
employing 100 persons or more a special economic committee 
must be established to discuss all decisions affecting 
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mergers, or structural changes which might adversely affect 
the workers of the enterprise. A brief table below shows 
the rights of the works' councils divided into the two main 
categories, excluding the right to information. 
TABLE 2 
WORKS' COUNCIL RIGHTS 
PARTICIPATION CO-DETERMINATION 
Ma n powe r planning 
Dismissals 
Work procedure 
Job situation 
Established organisation 
Operation changes 
Protection of labour 
Wo rking hours 
Methods of payment 
Vaca tIon 
Social ame ni ties 
Vocational training 
E s t a bI is hme n t order 
Hi r in g s 
Transfers 
Source: Worker Co-determination, Facts about Germany Edition 
for the Press and Information Office of the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Co-determination or Mitbestimmung, which was introduced 
in its modern form in 1951, gave workers in the mining and 
steel industries important co-determination rights as well 
as a participative voice in management. The new acts of 
1972 and 1976 extended co-determination rights to all the 
working population in the West German industry. 
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According to the West German industrial system, each 
enterprise has two major bodies of management The 
supervisory council CAufsichtsrat) and the executive board 
(Vorstand). The supervisory council is responsible for 
controlling the enterprise, and the executive board for the 
day-to-day running of the establishment The Works’ 
Constitution Act of 1952 proposes a parity representation 
between labour and management in the coal and steel 
industries employing more than 1,000 persons, with a neutral 
person nominated by the other members of the supervisory 
board. The other ten members consist of five persons 
representing the workers in the establishment one of whom is 
an independent representative appointed by the trade unions 
On the management side there are also five members nominated 
by the shareholders of the enterprise, the fifth person 
being independent The two independent persons nominated 
from both sides must not be members of a union or employers' 
organisation, nor employees of that particular firm, nor 
should they have an interest in that firm. 
On the executive board there must be a labour director 
whose function is to take care of personnel affairs and 
industrial relations, and who enjoys equal rights and cannot 
be nominated against the will of the labour representatives 
of the supervisory council 
The same Constitution Act of 1952 provides for one-third 
workers’ representation on the supervisory council in all 
joint stock enterprises with up to 2,000 employees and for 
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Other firms employing between 500 to 2,000 workers Thus, 
in an eIeven-member supervisory council of a joint stock 
company, four representatives come from the labour side, and 
eight from the shareholders' side. 
For the major industries employing more than 2,000 
persons the Co-determination Act of 1976 applies. According 
to the 1976 Act which covers about 500 such enterprises 
(except mining and steelD, there is parity representation 
between worker appointees and shareholder appointees The 
chairman and vice-chairman of the council are selected by 
the other members of that council with not less than a 
two-thirds majority. If this majority cannot be attained, 
the shareholders' representatives appoint the chairman, and 
the workers' representatives the vice-chairman. In the 
event of a dead-lock the chairman’s vote is the decisive 
one. 
The supervisory council consists of six representatives 
from each side in firms employing up to 10,000 employees. 
In enterprises employing between 10,000-20,000, there are 
eight representatives from each side, and in firms with more 
than 20,000 people there are ten members from either side. 
The public sector has many similarities with the private 
sector discussed above. According to the Personnel 
Representation Acts of 1955 and 1974, a personnel council 
similar to the works' council must be established in all 
ministries, government departments, the Police, the Post 
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Office, the Social Security institution, town halls, law 
courts, etc. which employ more than five public employees. 
The councils represent all civil servants, general staff and 
manual workers employed by the Federal Republic, and it 
varies in size according to the number of people employed in 
the particular office, the maximum being 31 representatives. 
Similar councils are provided for employees under the age of 
18 ' the youth councils • and the head of an office has to 
confer with the members of the council at least every month. 
All employees must be represented proportionately 
although the co-determination rights of general staff and 
manual workers are somewhat different from those of the 
civil servants. 
Those engaged in the first category have the right oi 
co-determination on such issues as working time, holiday 
planning, hiring and dismissals, welfare, training, 
redundancy policy, etc. and the manager of the office can 
only act with council approval. 
In the case of civil servant employees those rights are 
similar with the exception that all arbitration committee 
decisions Cin case of a dead-lock) can be over-ruled by 
management whereas for the other employees, the decision of 
the arbitration committee is binding. 
In general, public employees enjoy lesser 
private employees in the sense that the former 
freed om than 
cannot strike 
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and have certain limitations in collective bargaining. 
Although both employees and employers are not very 
satisfied with the present state of affairs, each side 
wanting more rights and representation, the existing 
Co-determination Act is likely to remain for the foreseeable 
future. The West German system of co-determination is c. 
success which is undisputed by all those concerned, 
including the three major political parties, and has proved 
stabilizing socio-economic factor for the Federal 
Republic. It renders both sides "social partners", making 
labour more responsible, certainly more productive, by 
giving them increased participation and motivation; two 
elements which have vastly contributed to the strength and 
efficiency of the West German industry. The Confederation 
of German Employers' Association CBDA) supporting all forms 
of co-determination within the West German economy, has 
expressed its support for co-operation with the trade 
unions. 
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PART TWO 
Structural Differences Between Trade 
Unions in North America and Europe 
European unions have a completely different background 
from their North American counterparts. This difference 
along with other factors analysed below, accounts for the 
superiority of the European industrial relations systems as 
compared with those of North America.^® 
.f we start by examining the ideological differences of 
the Western European and North American unions, we will see 
that the European labour movements started as revolutionary 
movements against the status quo, whereas trade unions in 
North America always regarded themselves as part of the 
capitalist system. European labour movements were the 
products of class struggle, and although initially 
revolutionary in essence, have developed a more reformatory 
character which is still maintained today. Their close 
association with politics, particularly through links with 
socialist and communist parties were aimed at bringing about 
the democratisation of the enterprise. Since the late 
nineteenth century, European unions have viewed themselves 
as the instrument for political democracy. With the 
exception of Italy and France where most unions became 
dominated by the Communist parties, the majority of European 
unions became associated with Socialist parties, and in some 
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countries where most of the population was Roman Catholic, 
unions collaborated with Christian Democratic parties The 
Christian Democratic parties, although closely associated 
with Christian unions, never dominated them and the support 
they received from the unions in elections depended on the 
stance they adopted.The more to the left their stance, 
the greater the support they would receive from the unions. 
The case of the British trade unions seems to be 
different. During the late nineteenth century, the British 
unions ran the risk of being labelled illegal associations 
responsible for restraining trade. They, therefore, sought 
ways of lobbying in Parliament in order to change the 
existing laws. Thus, aiming to appoint members 
Parliament who would represent union rights, they created 
various independent political parties out of which the 
Labour Party in the early twentieth century was created. 
Although the Labour Party is no longer dominated by British 
unions as much as it was, it is still supported by them and 
still represents trade union members in Parliament 
The association between unions and political parties in 
Britain is found in almost every Northern European E.E.C. 
country, eg. Belgium, West Germany, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, etc. This relationship, however, is not as strong. 
If we take West Germany as an example, there is a close bond 
between German trade unions and the Social Democratic Party. 
In 1905 the Social Democratic Party took over the leadership 
of most unions and became the dominating force behind their 
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actions. Labour representatives became members of the Party 
which served as a legal platform for the trade unions in 
their aim to promote industrial democracy. Trade unions 
managed to improve their collective bargaining position and 
the living conditions of their members, and this 
co-oepration lasted until World War I when the party split 
into two factions, also dividing trade unions. 
After the war, however, the factions decided to 
reconcile and a strong Social Democratic Party managed to 
fill its ranks with union representatives in 1919. To give 
an example of how strong the co-operation was, in 1924 out 
of 100 party members elected, 83 were union 
r e p r e s e n t a t i V e s . ® The rise of Adolf Hitler in the middle 
thirties and the dictatorship that followed his rise, broke 
up both partners but after World War II they again revived 
their association which exists to this day. 
The German example influenced similar close associations 
between unions and political parties in most of the 
neighbouring countries namely Holland, Austria and 
Switzerland. Especially in Holland, the Socialist unions 
merged with the Confederation of Labour CNVV) making the 
union the most influential group behind the policies of the 
Dutch Labour Party. 
As was mentioned earlier, the situation in France and 
Italy was completely different Especially in the former, 
mo s t union leaders saw themselves as anarchists who wanted 
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to topple the status quo without any political affiliations 
Thus, trade unions became independent of political parties, 
and the trade union congress of Amiens in 1906 was a proof 
of their independence. According to the congress, most 
trade unions renewed their pledge to stay away from 
political parties in order to fight the status quo. Until 
1934 the situation remained the same. The influence of the 
Communist Party, however, as well as of the Social Christian 
Party took its toll and soon enough trade unionists started 
joining these parties. Thus, unions were divided into 
c ommu nists, socialists, catholic and independents. 
After Wo r Id Wa r II the situation did not greatly change 
and the communist union movement, the C.G.T, claims a good 
portion of the labour population. Other labour 
confederations, namely the catholic, and the socialist 
CF.03, attracted many trade union members to their ranks, 
and even today the socialist F.O. (Force Ouvriere) has ties 
with Socialist leaders in the National Assembly. Although 
the bonds are not as close as in Great Britain, the unions 
offer support to the Socialist Party with a say In the party 
poI Icy. 
The aims of European unions are that by lobbying through 
their political partners, they can promote better living 
conditons, co-operation with private enterprises with 
government control and planning, and eventually bring about 
a more equitable democratic system. If we take into account 
that most of the parties supported by labour have formed 
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governments In the past and some at the present, one can 
easily realise how this union-party association can 
influence the economic policy of the states governed by such 
parties. 
in contrast, North American unions have resisted this 
political association and felt that collective bargaining 
within the enterprise is the major instrument for the 
improvement of working and living conditions of their 
members. North American unions did not identify themselves 
with the class struggle seen in the West European case, but 
on the contrary considered themselves as part of the 
capitalist society and did not seek ways of reforming it 
It is necessary here to digress in order to explain that 
British trade unions, while relying heavily upon collective 
bargaining like their North American counterparts, resemble 
other European unions in their partnership with a political 
party. In the United States though, government was often 
seen as an undesirable element in the industrial relations 
system, and consequently was not trusted and was viewed with 
suspicion. Unionism started in the skilled crafts 
Thereafter a struggle began, which still continues, to 
extend unionism to industry and the office in opposition to 
employers and, in many cases, opposing governments. 
The breakthrough for industrial unions came i about 
1933 when unionism started spreading to heavy industries 
such as steel, rubber, electrical, auto and other 
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enterprises throughout the United States. Soon with the new 
system of shop steward representation at the firm level, 
such issues as pensions, health plans, holidays and annual 
vacation plans, were incorporated in the collective 
bargaining process promoting the interests of industrial and 
craft labour.Under the North American collective 
bargaining system the union deals with the employers of 
individual firms, whereas in Europe most unions deal with 
employers associations so that entire industries are 
involved. Thus, in Europe, a much larger working population 
is affected by, or benefits from, an agreement when compared 
with their American or Canadian counterparts. 
Moreover, the grievance procedure in North America 
different from that in Europe. If there is a dispute by a 
worker, the shop steward is the first responsible person to 
solve the problem. If a solution to the dispute is not 
found, it is handled by higher ranking officers representing 
the management until finds its way to private 
arbi trat ion. 
By contrast, in Europe the problem is handled by the 
works' council who will discuss it with the employer If an 
agreement is not reached, the worker concerned can take 
to the labour court for a final solution. 
A s wa s 
interested 
enterprise, 
me ntioned above, 
in participation 
nor in wo r k s’ 
North American unions are 
at the top level of 
councils. As a result of 
not 
t h e 
t h e 
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independent position they seek, they do not get information 
about the future of the enterprise, which could otherwise be 
used as a tool to promote the interest of their members. 
Canadian and American legislation requires both partners to 
bargain in good faith, which means that both sides have to 
furnish the other with all the Information necessary for 
collective bargaining.®® There appears to be no intention to 
change the present system. 
On the other hand, European works’ councils can have 
access to more information, because of the representation at 
the plant level and can, therefore, conduct negotiations 
based on a plethora of relevant information concerning both 
day-to-day affairs as well as future aspects and plans 
Thus works' councils offer a better service to union members 
by receiving information of better quality as well as 
greater quantity. The distrust in works’ councils arises 
primarily from the belief that works’ councils are dominated 
by employers and that by sitting at the same table with 
them, it will undermine the loyalty of union representatives 
towards their members with adverse effect Of course, the 
European experience has shown the contrary, with West 
Germany being a model of a better industrial relations 
system based on works' councils and worker representation on 
the boards of the major industries. 
Another important factor 
relations in the two continents 
government, and specifically the 
determining 
is the r 0 
degree of 
industrial 
I e of the 
co-ope rat ion 
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between government, unions and the employers the 
enterpr ise. 
in North America there is no such co-operation between 
the three parties concerned although both union and employer 
organisations when necessary exert influence in the form of 
political lobbying without taking part themselves in the 
formulation of national policy. The importance of 
tripartite co-operation has been stressed repeatedly by 
prominent economists and labour organisations, but until the 
present time there has been no breakthrough. A good case in 
point is the demand expressed by the Canadian Labour 
Congress CC.L.C.) in its 1976 annual convention, to have a 
say in the formulation of national economic and social 
policy,^^ The Government of Canada reacted favourably but in 
less than a year the hopes for such a co-operation began to 
evaporate. Some unions were blamed for the failure to form 
such a tripartite body, and notably the Canadian Union of 
Public Employees CCUPE) which reacted unfavourably fearing 
that their position and political ties would be weakened. 
Due to the various levels of government in Canada and 
the United States, there is a difference in opinion and no 
centralized authority exists which would facilitate c 
tripartite co-operation. Indeed, one has to keep in mind 
that Canada has a federal system of government which 
consists of three levels of authority (regional, provincial, 
federal) which often creates problems of disagreements 
between the authorities involved. The United States have a 
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similar problem as state governments and the federal 
government often find themselves on the opposite side of the 
table. Furthermore, if we take account of the fact that 
individual unions and employers represent individual plants 
and not industries as a whole, in contrast with the European 
case, one can easily see the problems posed due to the 
multitude of different opinions and authorities involved. 
Examining the European system of tripartite co-operation 
and the consultative mechanisms involved, one can easily 
understand why there is a heavy dependence upon legislation 
in the field of industrial relations. In most West European 
countries the powerful labour and employer organisations 
which represent the whole of the industry can consult with 
the government and formulate socio-economic and political 
policy. By consulting each other, all parties involved have 
realised that the actions of each group affects the others, 
and that their interests are somehow interlocked towards c 
common policy. It is the attitude of "we are all in this 
together" which has its roots back in the post World War 
reconstruction period, that motivates a common strategy. As 
a result, the three parties can reach a consensus in such 
vital areas as job security, wages, training, working time, 
etc. Therefore, it is obvious that each of the 
organisations can influence government policy mainly because 
of the direct contact they maintain with the government 
through the tripartite consultative mechanisms at the 
national level. 
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Union recognition and co-operation between employers and 
employees is a further factor which accounts for the 
structural differences between North America and Europe. 
For some labour economists and industrial relations 
specialists, the difference in attitudes and relationships 
of workers and employers in Europe compared with the United 
States or Canada, constitutes the single most important 
factor responsible for contrasting industrial relations 
between the two continents. 
A description of the two constrasting systems will be 
necessary so that one can better understand the vast 
differences in attitudes involved in the two systems. 
The high degree of unionisation in Europe compared with 
that in North America, should be responsible for a higher 
number of strikes in the former compared with the latter 
In reality, the converse is true. As the table below shows, 
the European countries in the period 1967-76 had fewer 
strikes than Canada or the United States, although the rates 
of unionisation were much higher. The days lost due to 
strikes in the two North American countries were much more 
than the days lost in Europe. 
The numbers alone indicate that industrial conflict ir. 
North America is much more evident than in Europe which 
enjoys a healthier industrial relations system. If we add 
to this the fact that collective agreements in Europe cover 
T higher percentage of workers (including non-union), and 
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that unions represent a whole industry rather than an 
individual plant, the potential for a strike in Europe 
theoretically is much greater For example, in West Germany 
although total union membership is around 9 million workers, 
collective agr e erne nts cover 18 million wo rkers (about 9 0% o f 
the total working population), and a strike call by a union 
leader would lead to a potential time loss of higher 
magnitude than occurs in reality. Thus, the impact would be 
much bigger than it actually is 
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TABLE 3 
Industrial Disputes and Rates of Unionization i 
Selected Countries, 1967-1976* 
Country Days lost 
in strikes 
(average per year) 
Percentage of union- 
ization, 1976 of Non- 
agricultural wage and 
salary earners 
Austral i a 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denma r k 
Finland 
Federal Repub I i c 
of Germany 
1,13 1 
373 
1 , 906 
571 
957 
56 
55 
70 
3 7 
65 
78 
40 
Great Britain 
Japan 
Nether lands 
Nor wa y 
Swe den 
Swi tzer land 
Uni t e dSta t e s 
788 
244 
62 
67 
39 
1,349 
5 1-52 
3 5 
39-40 
63 
82-83 
37 
28-29 
Source I.L.O. and Employment Gazette (Great Britain), 
December 1977. Reprinted from Labour Relations in Advanced 
Industrial Societies, Issues and 
statistical data collected 
manufacturing, construction, 
although some local utilities 
countries. " Figures did not 
early eighties. 
Problems, p.47. Note: The 
represents strikes in 
and transport industries, 
were included in some 
change significantly in the 
-52- 
The subject of union recognition plays an important role 
here, since there is a difference in attitudes and 
legislation. Employers in Europe have not resisted, as a 
rule, union formation, with a few minor exceptions. The 
priority of reconstruction after World War *' forced both 
sides into a co-operation and a mutual recognition of each 
other's role. Both employers' organisations and union 
organisations are the key partners in industrial relations 
and are often referred to as the "social partners" in 
recognition of equality among them. Employers’ associations 
were founded in Europe, and represent, much like the unions, 
large geographical regions or a whole sector of the 
industry. As a result of this, as was mentioned earlier, 
bargaining (which includes all the enterprises of an 
industrial sector or a whole geographical area) is very 
important as it affects all those working or representing 
these enterprises. Thus, the benefits established through 
agreements cover the whole industry, and promote industrial 
policy to the national level In contrast, in the United 
States and Canada, individual firms have to bargain with the 
local union which makes the firm less competitive vis-a-vis 
other non-unionized firms and therefore increases the 
resistance of managers to unionization. Thus, there Is more 
at stake, and greater possibility of conflict Furthermore, 
industry wide bargaining because of its sheer size, prevents 
negotiators from breaking the negotiations since the 
resulting strike will paralyze the industry and affect all 
the workers and firms in it 
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in North America a union has to struggle in order to 
achieve recognition. To do so, it has to win an election by 
getting 61% of the workers' votes which will permit union 
establishment In a particular plant Once the union is 
established the employer by law must deal with the union and 
bargain with its representatives in good faith. However, 
the union does not achieve a majority, legislation permits 
the employer to exclude the union from bargaining. Because 
of this feature which Is a characteristic of the Canadian 
and United States industries, one may find firms which are 
either fully unionized or non-unionized at all 
Furthermore, the law prohibits unions to assist other 
workers in the non-unionized firms and, therefore, benefits 
obtained through collective bargaining do not cover the 
whole industry but only the lucky few who were able to form 
a union. The election itself sparks off conflict. As a 
matter of fact industrial relations in North America are 
based upon confrontation rather than co-operation. The 
distrust and the antipathy the one side feels for the other 
is the main feature of this relationship. This can be 
demonstrated rather vividly by the action the management 
takes in order to prevent unionization at their plant 
Union busting is very common In North America, and many law 
firms specialize in just that. Several books have been 
written on that subject, aiming at helping managers to 
prevent unionization in their plant. Books such as: Labour 
Unions: How to Avert them. Beat them, Out-negotiate them, 
Live with them. Unload them,** are very common. A study 
which was carried out by the AFL-CIO indicated that out of 
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600 unions seeking elections in the United States only 50% 
of them were able to achieve recognition, mainly because of 
anti-union practices carried out by the employers. In 
Europe such un i on-bust i ng techniques are virtually unheard 
of. Everett Kassalow mentions in an article titled: 
Industrial Conflict: The United States and Western Europe, 
the example of the Dutch Phillips electric company. 
According to Mr. Kassalow although only about 25% of the 
bIue-and-white collar workers were union members the company 
never considered anti-union practices at its plant As a 
contrasting example, one can mention the case of General 
Motors which used such practices in order to prevent 
unionization in their southern automobile plants. This 
action was aimed at the U.A.W. (United Automobile Workers) 
union which already represented about 90% of the company's 
workers. The contrast between the two examples ' 
self-explanatory demonstrating two different attitudes. 
Moreover, to give an additional example of the European 
mentality and the spirit of co-operation between the two 
sides one should quote Mr Kassalow who writes the same 
article: "I was struck by a report prepared by Sydney Roger 
of the University of California's institute of Industrial 
Relations. He accompanied team of San Francisco 
longshoremen who, with the support of the Ford Foundation, 
undertook a work study visit to the docks of Rotterdam,the 
Netherlands. In Rotterdam they found r. far more 
co-operative work atmosphere, greater Job security, and 
greater community respect for the Dutch longshoremen than 
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they found in San Francisco." 
The socio-economic nature of most European countries and 
particularly the welfare state and socio-economic planning, 
tend to promote union-managernent co-operation. A government 
which has to balance economic growth and full employment, 
will use such tools as taxation, income policies and 
manpower planning which are likely to put the pressure on 
both sides and make them more co-operative. 
Trade itself is far more important to Europe than it is 
to North America as about 20-30% of the gross national 
product In most European countries is exported in the form 
of goods. Thus, this heavy reliance on trade makes 
employers and unions more sensible in that they have 
realized that co-operation is inevitable if they want to be 
more competitive in the world markets, especially when they 
have to compete with such giants as Japan and the United 
States. 
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PART THREE 
Worker influence on economic and social policy making 
Democratic values are the background to the European 
movement towards greater worker representation, and c 
stronger voice in matters affecting the well-being of 
workers. The well accepted principles that all individuals 
have equal political rights, the majority elects the 
government, and that people should be involved in decisions 
affecting their lives, are basic elements of our culture 
Today's trade unions operate on a broader basis, and one 
of their main areas of Interest is the notion of employee 
participation. A report issued by the Trade Union Congress 
in Britain addressed to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions 
and Employers' Associations includes the following 
recommendation: "Provision should be made at each level in 
the management structure for trade union representatives of 
the work people employed in these industries to participate 
in the formulation of policy and in the day-to-day operation 
of these industries.*'* 
in some Western European countries such as West Germany 
and Holland there have been attempts to increase employee 
influence in organizational decision-making by the 
introduction of such representation bodies as workers' 
councils and supervisory boards and by the election of 
worker directors. 
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FoMowing Britain's entry into the European Economic 
Community (E.E.C) there has been an additional influence on 
political thought. The Draft Fifth Directive of the E.E.C. 
which stems from the experience of West Germany and the 
Netherlands, recommends a two-tier board structure: 
supervisory board which incorporates worker representatives, 
and determines company policy, appoints and thus controls, " 
management board responsible for running the company. 
Participation is a concept consisting of inter-related 
elements which are visible in the decision-making processes 
of an organisation. These elements which form the basis of 
participation are influence, interaction or consultation, 
and information. 
The notion of influence is of primary importance to the 
concept of participation. It has a rather broad meaning and 
cannot be defined narrowly. There are many ways in which 
influence can be exerted within an organisation over 
decision-making, either by workers or managers 
"Participation" according to “ D. Wall and '' 
Lischeron,*® "refers to Influence in decision-making exerted 
through a process of interaction between workers and 
managers and based upon Information sharing. The degree to 
which influence is exerted determines the degree of 
participation which occurs given that such influence is 
exerted through ~ process of interaction and 
information-sharing and is not solely dependent upon 
coercive powe r 
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The highest level of participation occurs when both 
workers and managers exert equal influence over 
decision-making. The West German co-determination system in 
the mining, iron, steel industries is the closest example to 
that 
The degree, the aim of participation, and the type Oi 
institutions which were later developed, vary from country 
to country within Europe. In some cases even within 
enterprises or industries. Nevertheless, there are some 
common characteristics in most Western European countries 
and more so within the E.E.C. countries, and are related to 
the three main areas of co-operation between workers and 
management: information, consultation, and decision-making. 
The degree of influence which can be exerted by 
employees on management depends not only on the power of the 
union representing them, but also on the type of relation or 
co-operation between the managers and the managed within the 
enterprise. Furthermore, a point of particular importance 
is that the influence exerted by workers largely depends on 
the ability of employee representatives to use effectively 
the information received, so as to develop convincing 
arguments in their talks with management 
The ways in which workers can participate the 
framework of industrial democracy, form a broad spectrum 
which can be characterised by four terms: communication, 
consultation, collective bargaining, and co-determination. 
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Alt hough these terms were discussed in the first part of 
this paper, it is essential to explain their function again 
as they establish workers' rights and enable worker 
representatives to use them as a means of influence in the 
decision-making process. 
Communication: it means a two-way information channel 
between the workers and the managers of the enterprise, 
where the final decision is taken by the management. 
Consul tat ion: 
representatives 
latter to reach 
Viewp o i n t . 
the term Implies the engagement of 
in talks with management in order 
a decision after hearing the 
wo r k e r 
for the 
wo r k e r 
Collective bargaining: its aim is the achievement of a 
mutual agreement within traditional frameworks, and the 
final decision depends again on management If such an 
agreement is not achieved workers can exert their 
negotiating influence with strike as the final weapon. 
Co-determination: this form of industrial democracy not 
only promotes workers’ rights during the decision-making 
process undertaken by management, but also limits strike 
action because it presupposes substantial empIoyee-empIoyer 
co-operation for its success. Co-determination does not 
exclude collective bargaining which is based on the 
traditional worker-empIoyer relation. Experience shows that 
the most advanced forms of industrial democracy do not 
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eliminate but complement the collective bargaining process, 
to the point where they improve the endogenous causes of a 
c o n f I i c t . 
Moreover, participatory schemes which encourage the 
co-operation between workers and management in the 
enterprise, have grown to industrial and national level 
With the addition of the Draft Fifth Directive they have 
grown to E.E.C. level. Following institutional or mutual 
agreements, worker representatives acguired the right to 
participate in tripartite bodies at the industrial, national 
or E.E.C. level The purpose of such bodies is to influence 
through consultation, governmental or E.E.C. policy related 
to problems facing the industry, or even bigger ones of 
national or E.E.C. importance. 
At this point one must draw a line between the two types 
of employee participation, namely immediate (direct) and 
distant (indirect) participation. 
Immediate participation refers to lower 
involvement in decisions within the 
hierarchy, usually Involving first-line 
supervisors. Employees involved in such 
participation are mainly concerned with the 
activities which have little impact outsi 
department or working group. 
level employee 
organisational 
managers or 
r. form of 
everyday wo r k 
d e ‘ given 
o n Distant participation the other hand is far mo r e 
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important for those concerned as it gives workers a voice, 
through their representatives, in the top management 
boardrooms. The influence exerted by worker representatives 
and the ensuing decision-making undertaken by management, 
are less relevant to worker’s own job activities but more 
beneficial to the employee organisation as a whole. 
The most common form of distant (or indirect) 
participation found in Europe at the industry level, :s the 
works' councils. These councils are, in practice, either 
representing worker groups, or employee management bodies 
which discuss and consult each other regarding problems of 
mutual interest, with the purpose of reaching an agreement 
or to influence the decisions made. Thus, the composition 
of these bodies differs from country to country, Belgium, 
Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, and Luxembourg being 
different from other E.E.C. member states. In these 
countries, works' councils consist of worker representatives 
' elected by the workers in the enterprise " and management 
representatives, appointed by the top management On the 
other hand, in West Germany and the Netherlands, works' 
councils consist only of wo rker representatives. 
The topics and subjects of discussions involving these 
works' councils vary according to the agreements between © 
workers and management, or national law. They usually 
include: production and productivity, financial and company 
matters, personnel, and finally the working environment 
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(ndlrect participation , because of the closer relation 
between the employees and the top management, provides the 
opportunity for employees to affect the decision-making 
process and managerial prerogatives. Much of the talks 
concentrate on policy issues and as it involves symbolic 
assumptions it provides an element of trust betwen employees 
and the top management. 
Most works' councils do not have co-decision rights 
thereby limiting themselves to some form of co-operation. In 
reality this means that they have the right to protest 
against decisions taken, and also to propose and be 
consulted. 
However, there is higher level of indirect 
participation where the co-decision right is granted. In 
1970 the Federal Republic of Germany was the only country 
where worker representatives had a seat on the board of 
directors in private enterprises. By 1976, most industries 
employing over 2,000 workers were obliged by law to grant 
co-decision rights to employee representatives. 
Although West Germany is the only country in Europe 
where co-decision is Implemented by law, in some countries, 
such as Denmar’k, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands there are 
provisions for employee participation in the board of 
directors in most industries. In France, the Sudreau 
Committee proposed joint supervision as the final target of 
enterprise reconstruction. In Italy, where workers do not 
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participate in administrative bodies in the same way as 
the above mentioned countries, worker organisations share 
the responsibilities with the top ma nagement for the 
investment policy of certain large private enterprises, 
within the framework of collective agreements. In the 
United Kingdom during the seventies, the government had 
announced new programmes calling for improved legislation 
which would guarantee worker representatives in the 
committees of large enterprises. The debate regarding the 
number of representatives, and whether they would be 
appointed by the unions or elected by the enterprise 
employees, took several years. In 1979, these new 
programmes were abandoned by the new Conservative 
Government. However, two years later the Ministry of 
Employment began supporting programmes promoting employee 
participation. Part of this change was due to the 
deterioration of industrial relations, and the drop 
productivity. A series of directives were issued, aiming at 
helping the industry establish some degree of co-operation, 
voluntarily, or even through special union-managernent 
agreement. The government, however, should establish in the 
future some legal frameworks in order to harmonize itself 
with the proposed E.E.C. Directive regarding employee 
participation. 
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Emolovee Participation and Influence in the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
The System of Co-Determination 
Co-determination or "Mitbestimmung" as it is known in 
West Germany, could be defined as the co-decision making (or 
equal say) in the social and economic decisions within the 
enterprise by workers through their representatives.^® 
"M i t b e s t i mmu n g " started In the private industry by law ir. 
1951 This law introduced a system of co-determination into 
the West German coal, iron, and steel industries, where 
companies employing at least 1,000 workers were obliged to 
grant co-determination rights for the workers on the 
supervisory boards ("Aufsichstrate") The 1976 law extended 
these co-determination rights to all workers of major 
industries employing 2,000 or more workers. The almost 
equal representation of workers on the supervisory boards ir 
most industries in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
constitutes the most developed form of worker participation 
in the free market However, one must not underestimate the 
role of I owe r level wo rks' councils, because in West 
Germany, they represent the workers of almost all 
enterprises, whether they are members of a union or not In 
fact, the West German system of joint-consultation the 
most sophisticated, where works' councils play c. very 
important role in industrial life. The DGB (German Trade 
Union Confederation) has been very active in seeking more 
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powers for the works’ councils, and improving their 
functioning. The 1972 Works' Constitution Act recognised 
many DGB aims, and made works’ councils more responsible for 
handling employee grievances, policing the union contract, 
hire and fire of employees, transfers and promotion. Works’ 
councils have been given the legal right to equal influence 
with the employers in such decision-making issues as those 
mentioned above. They also have the right to adequate 
information from management about pending decisions. 
The higher level supervisory boards are organs 
responsible for investment and policy, and their main role 
is to supervise management board decisions According to 
labour constitutional law, the supervisory committee (board) 
has the power to ensure that the law is implemented and 
observes collective bargaining agreement concerning wages, 
and other employee-management agreements Moreover, :* 
makes sure that management has not taken any unilateral 
decision which would have a damaging Impact on the 
employees. The German labour law goes even further, 
protecting workers In small enterprises Enterprises 
employing 100 workers or more must have an economic 
committee appointed by the works' council The employer is 
obliged to inform this committee regularly on matters 
concerning the financial situation of the enterprise, 
investments, planning organisation, and to study these 
matters together with the economic committee.®^ 
n West Germany, there is an intensive, continuous 
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dialogue between economic researchers, economists, the 
federal government, industrial organisations and trade 
unions. This institutionalized form of "Concerted Action" 
was established by the coalition government in 1966. 
According to Federal Chancellor Dr. Kiesinger (1966) "the 
scope for expansion policy depends on the success of 
voluntary, joint efforts by the trade unions and employers' 
associations to adopt an attitude of stability within 
economic upswing.““ "Concerted Action" does not go so far as 
agreements on specific topics such as wages or price 
controls. There is an exchange of views, which takes place 
regularly during each year, between the Federal Economics 
Ministry, all industrial associations, the Federal Bank, the 
Council of Experts and the trade unions. The talks include 
wages and prices, profits, investments, orders and exports. 
What they do, in fact, is to cover all the main factors 
which exert influence on the incomes situation. 
This tripartite co-operation including the federal 
government, the employers' associations and the Trade Union 
Confederation, plays a very important role in the outcome of 
decisions regarding economic policy. While the data 
produced by the federal government and the Federal Bank, as 
well as various economic research institutes, has an 
influence on pay talks, collective agreements influence on 
the work of legislators. For example, the economization 
protection agreement which was concluded by the Textiles and 
Clothing Employees' Union and the respective employers' 
association, was very beneficial for the employees. The 
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social plans concerning factory closures which came about 
from this agreement, have been adopted by the legislators as 
a model of company closure Cfor all forms of company 
closure), and incorporated in Company Constitutional Law 
regarding dismissal from employment.^® 
Finally, another characteristic of the German system 
promotes employee participation, which exerts influence on 
E.E.C. policy concerning company structure, is the two level 
co-decision system which is shown in diagrams 1 and 3 below 
and will be discussed later. 
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DIAGRAM 3 
TliE CO-DECISION SYSTEM IN ALL THE LARGE WEST GERMAN 
ENTERPRISES AFTER 1976 EXCLUDING THE MINING, IRON, AND 
STEEL INDUSTRIES WHERE THE SYSTEM OF PARITY REPRESENTATION 
IN SUPERVISORY BOARDS STILL PREVAILS 
NUMBER OP REPRESENTATIVES IN 
SUPERVISORY BOARDS OF ENTER- 
PRISES EMPLOYING 
FROM 2  10,000 WORKERS 
ELECTED SENIOR 
EMPLOYEE MEMBER 
0 
I 
ELECTED MEMBER- 
REPRESENTATIVES 
OF WORKERS AND 
EMPLOYEES 
jSt 
MEMBER-RE- 
PRESENTATIVES 
APPOINTED BY 
THE UNIONS 
EI£Q,TED„ MEMBERSsrSHAREHOT.URR 
FROK 10  20,000 WORKER  
Source: " Social Report" Bonn 
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DIAGRAM 4 
THE WEST GERMAN SYSTEM OF WORKER'S PARTICIPATION 
THROUGH THE WORK'S COUNCILS AND SUPERVISORY BOARDS 
IN THE MANAGEMENT OP PRIVATE ENTERPRISES 
SHAREHOLDER COMMITTEE 
r 
I 
I 
ELECTS SHAREHOLDER 
REPRESENTATIVES I 
I 
— SUPERVISORY BOARD 
T 
ELECTS THE RE- 
PRESENTATIVE 
MEMBERS OP THE 
BOARD 
ELECTS 
/ 
LOCAL WORK'S 
COUNCIL 
APPOINTS 
THE EXECUTIVE 
BOARD 
CENTRAL WORK'S 
COUNbiL 
ELECTS 
LOCAL WORK'S 
COUNCIL 
ELECTS 
\ 
LOCAL WORK'S 
COUNCIL 
7F 
Source: Dr, C. Jecchinis, " I Simmetochi ton Ergasomenon 
sti Diikisi ton Epichiriseon”,Athens 1984. 
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Emplovee Participation and Influence in the 
Netherlands 
There are two central employers' organisations, as well 
as four union federations in the Netherlands. The former 
are the Federation of Netherlands Industry CNVOD and the 
Netherlands Christian Employers’ Federation CNCW) The four 
union federations are: the Netherlands Federation of Trade 
Unions (NVVD, the Netherlands Federation of Catholic Trade 
Unions CNKV), the Netherlands Federation of Protestant Trade 
Unions CCNV), and finally the Netherlands Executive Staff 
Unions Federation (NCHP). 
All organisations are heavily involved in all fields Oi 
social and economic policy. The unions, in particular, are 
represented on many bodies which advise the government and 
discharge functions in the field of public law. All unions 
affiliated to the four federations are organised by 
occupation or sector of industry. The federations 
themselves, are part of the Joint Industrial Labour Council 
and the Socio-Economic Council CSER) 
The government, in its role of implementing and framing 
the social and economic policy, is assisted by councils and 
corporations which are run by representatives of those 
engaged in the industry. Thus, the industry is partly 
responsible for the introduction and implementation of 
certain socio-economic policies. According to their 
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functlon these bodies are (a) autonomous: as they decide and 
arrange on a number of matters in socio-economic policy 
making, (b) policy-making: sharing the responsibility in 
policy making, and Cc) advisory: advising the government on 
poI icy. 
In the Netherlands there are efforts to give workers 
say in all matters concerning them, both nationally and ir 
the various sectors of the industry. 
The Socio-Economic Council which was founded 1950, 
plays an important role in social and economic 
administration. It is an advisory body, and represents the 
industry thanks to the power given to it by law. It has 45 
members, the Crown, the employers' organisations, and the 
central trade unions each appointing 15 members. In this 
tripartite body the Crown representatives, the employers and 
the employees work together and issue draft recommendations 
which frequently are identical to the ultimate 
recommendations. Some of the SER committees are responsible 
for works' councils, mergers, national economic development, 
international socio-economic affairs, consumer affairs, 
social insurance, and the Employment Council All 
recommendations issued by the SER influence the government 
and especially those which are unanimous. The SER is not 
only the highest advisory body for the government on 
socio-economic matters but also supervises compliance with 
the merger code, it assists in appointing directors of large 
companies and can widen the powers of the works' councils by 
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decree. .t is also responsible for the supervision 
commodity and industrial boards. 
The commodity and industrial boards, also founded ir 
1960, have different functions. The former is responsible 
for the food sector and represents the cultivation, breeding 
and manufacture of a product as well as the wholesale and 
retail trades that handle that product The latter is set 
up for companies in the commerce sector, and covers 
agriculture, fisheries, industry, the wholesale trade, the 
retail trade, and the service industries. 
in both bodies, the employers' and workers' 
representatives are equally represented, and appointed by 
the Crown. The commodity bodies are more powerful in the 
sense that they enforce regulations in the economic sphere, 
including the regulation of prices. The industrial boards 
have socio-economic powers, and some of them establish wage 
regulations which apply either to all labour agreements, or 
to agreements which are not subject to collective 
bargaining. They can take independent action on matters 
concerning training, subsidising research, issuing 
Informative publications, preventing seasonal unemployment, 
and improving production methods. Commodity boards on the 
other hand, are often responsible for the implementation of 
regulations of the European Communities. 
Some other bodies appointed by the Crown and responsible 
for socio-economic policy. are the Social Security Council 
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CSVR), and the Industrial Insurance Board. Both bodies are 
workers appointed in equal numbers. The SVR has a number of 
committees responsible for the supervision of wages, 
co-ordination of social insurance, wages and income tax. !* 
supervises the implementation of statutory employer 
insurance, disablement insurance, sickness benefits, and the 
unemployment insurance, all covered by corresponding acts 
The industrial insurance boards are set up by employers' 
and employees' Organisations and their job is to put 
employees' insurance into effect Each sector of industry 
has its own insurance board which supervises and implements 
the statutory disablement insurance, the statutory health 
insurance, and the statutory redundancy pay and unemployment 
insurance. 
The Worker participation in the Netherlands 
Works' councils in the Netherlands cover not only the 
Industry but all groups of employees covered by labour 
agreements. Specifically they cover employees working i" 
industries, factories, offices, shops, hospitals, old 
people’s homes, cultural facilities, and non-profit 
organisations. The management must always ask the advice of 
the council before taking any measures affecting workers' 
lives. The council must be consulted prior to 
decision-making for matters concerning mergers, closures, 
reorganisation, moving, cuts or expansion of work, long-term 
co-operation with other establishments, etc. All 
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information needed by the works' councils in order to 
conduct its duties, must be supplied by the management 
When an employer does not comply with the Works'CounciI Act, 
a Cantonal Court may be called to give a ruling.®® 
Incomes and Wages policy 
Incomes policy in the Netherlands has received constant 
attention since Wo r Id Wa r I! There has been a ma rked move 
in that direction due to a desire for fair distribution of 
incomes. Social security, the statutory minimum wage, and 
the progressive effect of taxation have been strongly 
influenced by unions, through the SER and other committees. 
Lately, there has been a strong pressure in Parliament 
towards a fairer incomes distribution within the framework 
of socio-economic policy. Some of the expected measures 
include: 
1) The change of the decision-making procedure so that the 
social partners are involved : r talks on the 
distribution of the national product between the public 
sector, social security, wages and other income. 
5 The p r omo t io n 
long term, 
opportunity 
preventing ce 
of a fairer 
by seeing 
to reach a 
rtain groups 
distribution of incomes 
that everybody has an 
certain income level, 
from exerting undue inf 
in the 
e g u a I 
and by 
u e n c e . 
3 ) The use of government statutory powers directly 
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influence wages and prices in special circumstances, as 
the determination of wages and prices is usually left to 
ma rket forces. 
43 Policy on the social security, subsidies and taxation 
remain an important factor in the redistribution of 
incomes, as they remedy the effects of the market 
forces . 
The SER is preparing a recommendation which deals with 
all four me a s u r e s. 
The wages policy which originated at the end of World 
War !' is part of the general social and economic policy. 
Although the government in the beginning did not play r 
major role in wage fixing, the Influence exerted by 
industrial organisations started to thin out in the fifties 
and the early sixties. Both the trade unions and the 
employers' associations started resisting the extent of 
government influence. With the establishment of the SER the 
power to approve collective labour agreements was taken from 
the Board of Government Mediators and given to the Joint 
Industrial Labour Council The relevant criteria were 
established together by the government and the Joint 
Industrial Labour Council and were based on SER estimates of 
the overall wage cost rises, after consultation with the 
industrial organisations. 
recommendation made by the SER in 1971 the wages 
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policy was placed in the context of a medium term economic 
policy. According to the plan, a c ommittee of experts would 
submit to the Joint Industrial Labour Council and the SER an 
annual socio-economic policy recommendation, including wages 
and prices. The role of the government is to consult both 
sides of the industry |>efore the formulation of such policy. 
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Trade Union Influence in Britain 
The Seventies 
The close ties between the Labour Party and the trade 
union movement, especially after the former took office in 
1974 and became the governing party, led to an alliance 
known as the social contract. The seventies in Britain were 
characterized by high inflation, unemployment, balance of 
trade deficits, a weak currency and British manufacturing 
was in peril. However, although these problems existed 
then, the strong alliance remained unshaken. The social 
contract was viewed by many as a means of trade union 
influence which lead to tyrannical power on the government 
and threatened the constitution itself In reality, 
although trade union influence was strong, t did not 
succeed in many issues which were considered very important 
by trade union leaders. These will be mentioned later. 
On the other hand, the Labour Party argued that all over 
Western Europe and especially in West Germany and 
Scandinavia where trade unions and the social democratic 
parties were working together for a fairer society, the 
close co-operation succeeded in creating a richer and 
financially better society for everybody. Moreover, the 
party claimed that the social contract was the British 
answer to the development which started in the seventies all 
over Europe.®’ 
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The social contract was born in 1970 after the election 
defeat of the Labour Party. Both the TUC (Trade Union 
Congress) and the Labour Party in their effort to oppose 
Edward Heath’s Industrial Relations Bill, decided to 
establish a committee on a permanent basis. Since the 
foundation of the Labour Party by unions in 1900, the ties 
between them had been very strong with the exception of the 
sixties when they grew strained. Now, there was an effort 
to repair the damage and to proceed together for the 
formulation of a future industrial relations policy. 
The Liaison Committee which was founded in 1971 sought 
to reform industrial relations creating a Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service, made up of employer and union 
representatives. Moreover it called for an extension of 
worker rights in matters concerning membership of a union, 
unfair dismissals, minimum notice, and refusal by the 
employer of union recognition and information. 
In 1972 and 1973 the Liaison Committee expanded its work 
on general economic policy including inflation, the balance 
of payments, unemployment, and the cost of living. 
A statement released by the Liaison Committee in 1973 
was: " the first task of a new Labour Government would be 
to conclude with the TUC a wide ranging agreement on the 
policies to be pursued in all these aspects of our economic 
life and to discuss with them the order of priorities for 
their fuIfi I men t."®^ 
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Close co-operation between the Labour Party and the 
trade unions continued after the Labour Party took office in 
1974 and in the period 1975-76 it was to the Liaison 
Committee that the Cabinet looked for help and guidance. 
During 1974 the Labour Government programme was met with 
approval by the TUC. The repeal of the Industrial Relations 
Act was a priority which was hailed by the trade unions. 
The new Trade Union and Labour Relations Act was passed in 
the 1974 parliamentary session. Another legislation which 
was of prime interest to the TUC, namely the Health and 
Safety at Work Act, was also passed that same year. 
Although, as it was mentioned before, the TUC influenced 
the Labour Party's economic policy, financial realities were 
the barrier towards the full implementation of the social 
contract. The balance of payment deficit, and the weak 
pound accounted among others to the difference in opinion 
between the government and the TUC in the Spring of 1975. 
Trade unions pressed for an increase in public spending 
when the government did the exact opposite cutting 
expenditure. Moreover the level of wage increases (around 
25% annually) alarmed the government, and although the 
Incomes policy was carefully avoided in the original social 
contract, it created further differences in outlook between 
t h e two partners. 
1 9 7 5 e c o n omic crisis forced the government to take 
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measures such as a pay policy, massive borrowing from the 
International Monetary Fund in order to save a catastrophic 
deflation. 
At the same time the TUC worried about the welfare oi 
the low income families demanded improvements in the social 
wage, food subsidies, price controls, manpower planning, 
etc., which the government failed to deliver. 
However, TUC pressure succeeded in persuading the 
government to take action in 1976-76 to ease the job crisis 
and boost investment. The TUC Economic Review urged the 
government to set a target of 600,000 unemployed by 1978. 
It also urged a wealth tax and a £1,900 million budget 
increase.®® 
However, although the TUC disagreed with the Labour 
policy it did not break the alliance. It accepted the £2,300 
million IMF loan in order to protect the pound against its 
fall The Industrial policy followed by the Labour 
Government was not greatly influenced by the TUC. Although 
both agreed on the creation of the National Enterprise Board 
CNEB) in order to start industry planning, the government, 
fearing a damaged business confidence by the introduction of 
a massive public body, backed down especially after some 
pressure from the Confederation of British Industry (CBID 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson did not want a NEB control 
over private industries while the TUC advocated freedom for 
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the NEB to carry out its own acquisition strategy. The TUC 
wanted to see more union influence at company level through 
participation in programmes covering such issues as 
Investment, imports and exports, and pricing policy. The 
government did not succeed in the implementation of planning 
agreements covering all these strategic decisions and the 
TUC complained on many occasions through their Economic 
Review about the slow progress. 
Manpower policy was the field where the TUC exercised 
most of Its influence. Faced by a rise in unemployment the 
government sought TUC advice in order to reduce the job 
crisis. 
The 1975-76 period saw steps taken by the government 
with TUC approval towards job creation schemes and temporary 
employment subsidies. The TUC's idea of c job creation 
subsidy in the most depressed areas became in 1976 a major 
manpower policy. TUC pressure for funds for employment and 
training did also succeed in becoming a major manpower 
p r o g r amme. 
Other areas where the trade unions were very influential 
were industrial relations and Industrial democracy. Both 
were an early commitment of the social contract and were 
respected by the Labour Government In September 1974 the 
government published a document laying down provisions for 
guaranteed earnings, maternity pay and leave, union and 
public duties time off, measures against discrimination for 
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trade union members, the right to union recognition and 
information disclosure as well as union consultation before 
declaring redundancies.*^ The government provisions found 
warm support with the TUC on the whole, and the legislation 
was responsible for more union influence. 
In 1977 the Bullock Committee on industrial democracy 
produced Its report. It favoured a parity representation on 
company board of enterprises employing over 2,000 workers, 
the worker representatives being chosen through the union 
mechanisms. One cannot easily prove that union influence on 
industrial democracy dictated the government's position. As 
Britain is far behind other European countries in worker 
representation and decision-making, the social contract was 
the first step towards equal representation and 
decision-making In British industry. 
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Worker Participation in the Republic of Ireland 
The Republic of Ireland introduced in 1977 an act, the 
Worker Participation Act, which provided for the election of 
employees who would fill one-third of the seats on the 
boards of seven public companies. These companies are: 
The British and Irish Steam Packet Company (shipping^ 
The Electricity Supply Board Aer Lingus (the national 
airline) Bord n Mona (peat processing) Nitrigin Eireann 
(fertiliser production) Comhiucht Sinicre Eireann (sugar 
company) CIE (state railways) 
Worker directors from these state companies are elected 
directly by all employees of each enterprise, and can be 
nominated only by a trade union or the unions representing 
the employees of these particular enterprises. If the 
returning officer decides that a particular body of people 
can act as a collective bargaining party, then this party 
can represent the employees of the enterprise in question. 
The returning officer at elections can be either the 
Secretary of the designated body or any other person whom 
the Secretary considers to be both capable of doing the job 
and is acceptable to a majority of the employees. The 
returning officer may not nominate a candidate at elections 
and cannot be proposed as a candidate himself The 
government has the right to appoint the other two-thirds of 
directors, from persons representing not only the government 
but society's interests as a whole. 
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The whole question of worker directors was not very 
popular in the beginning, because both the Irish industry 
and some trade unions were afraid that worker directors 
would betray their interests. 
A study undertaken by the Irish Productivity Centre®® 
proved that all these fears were dispersed very soon after 
the beginning of the experiment, and most senior managers, 
company directors, trade unionists, and employees not only 
began to accept the idea but also to welcome it. Michael 
Gastello, one of the four worker directors for Aer Lingus 
the national airline ■■ explains: "those who were originally 
opposed to the initiative accepted the inevitable with good 
grace and decided to do all possible to make it work" 
Although some Initial difficulties had to be ironed out, 
the Irish participatory system had been very successful 
According to Michael Costello, "there is evidence of 
improved harmony and a better climate in the organisation 
concerned arising from the fact that employees are 
represented at the highest forum in the company. !t would 
appear that this representation has given comfort to 
employees in the difficult economic climate that has 
prevailed in recent years; the work-forces of these seven 
enterprises can at least be sure that any decisions 
relation to their future employment will eventually have to 
be discussed at a forum on which they are represented".*® 
Fears that trade union activists would be incapable 
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adoptlng a participative role have been dissolved. Many 
critics of participation, advocating that such activists 
would take a radical position whenever they had the chance, 
were proved wrong in their assumption. During the seven 
years of the Irish experiment trade union activists 
displayed their skills in participation without adopting e 
radical position. 
Furthermore, those participating in the boards of the 
seven enterprises have learned more about where decisions 
are made, and have acguired a better understanding of the 
decision-making process. 
Another area where the experiment was proved successful 
IS the communication between management and the worker 
directors. Because these worker directors attend the board 
meetings and receive information on the performance of their 
company, this information is passed down the line and thus 
workers have a better picture regarding company operations. 
In conclusion, it may be said that the Irish experiment 
of worker participation in the management of state or public 
enterprises, has been fairly successful and that in addition 
to the satisfaction of the employees, ■* is making a 
positive contribution to good industrial relations and 
managerial efficiency. 
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Worker Participation in the European Community 
Since its foundation, the European Community sought 
measures to ensure that industrial democracy would be 
preserved within its frontiers and that the interests of the 
working population would not depend on individual employers 
and shareholders alone, but on the Member States as well, 
whose task it would be to protect workers' rights and 
promote industrial democracy. 
When the Community proposed workers’ participation for 
the first time, only the Federal Republic of Germany had 
employee representatives on company boards. By 1980 three 
other countries (Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) 
had similar provisions for workers' participation on company 
boards, while the other E.E.C. members had plans for future 
appiication. 
Recognizing that most E.E.C. member countries had 
increased interest in worker's participation, particularly 
West Germany, the Commission of the European Company 
provided a management and a supervisory board (West Germany 
style) for I imi ted-I iabi I ity companies within the Community. 
The European Company statute proposed a one-third worker 
participation on the supervisory board of the European 
companies. In addition, there would be a European works' 
council In all the enterprises belonging to the European 
comp any. 
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Furthermore, recognizing that the states which form the 
E.E.C. have different needs and social systems, the European 
Commission sought to harmonize national company law 
especially with respect to worker participation. For this 
purpose, it drew up various formulas and directives which 
required the member states to ensure that all laws which 
apply to private and public companies fall within a common 
framework. For this purpose, in 1972, the Commission 
presented the proposal for a Fifth Directive which offered 
methods of ensuring that workers could participate on the 
supervisory boards of European companies. Later, with the 
entry of Ireland, Denmark and Great Britain into the E.E.C. 
this Fifth Directive was further amended and in 1975, the 
so-called "Green Paper" was published, which recognizes 
flexibility on matters of employee participation and company 
structure. The call for flexibility is derived from the 
recognition of worker's participation within the Community 
which, due to political and social realities, would require 
some time before its implementation. 
The Fifth Directive required all companies to operate 
under a two-tier board structure (ie. with a supervisory 
board and a management board), and that all companies 
employing 500 persons or more, would provide for worker 
representation on the supervisory board. In February 1975, 
a draft directive was adopted by the Council of Ministers 
concerning dismissals and redundancies. According to the 
directive, employers planning dismissals must first consult 
with workers' representatives in order to avoid or reduce 
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t hese I ay-0 f f s 
must give at 
representatives 
solutions which 
and their grave consequences. The employer 
least a 30 day notice to the workers' 
as well as the authorities in order to seek 
may avert or compromise any such decisions 
Another directive which sought to safeguard workers' 
rights in cases of mergers and takeovers was adopted by the 
Council of Ministers in February 1977.®’' According to this 
directive all workers concerned must be informed ahead of 
time of any imminent merger or takeover, given sufficient 
reason for it, as well as the consequences for their jobs. 
further amendment of the Fifth Directive which was 
adopted by the European Parliament in May 1982, is r 
significant step forward towards industrial democracy. 
Although left-wing parties disapproved of the new 
amendment claiming it did not give workers a complete parity 
vis-a-vis management, the majority of the European 
Parliament accepted and adopted the new directive. 
The new proposals by the European Commission which have 
been adopted by the member states of the E.E.C. are as 
foilows: 
Introduction of the dualist system (management body and 
supervisory body) only on optional basis, the one way 
system (board of directors) being the only one known in 
the Member States (United Kingdom in the lead). 
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) Introduction of the participation regime i i companies 
with 1,000 workers Cand not 500, as the European 
Commission proposed). 
’) Nomination of the supervisory body on joint basis, 
ensuring equivalent representation of shareholder and 
workers, following a transitional period which would be 
laid down by the Council. 
The first proposal was c compromise between two 
different models; the German-Dutch model which advocates c 
two-tier system (management and supervisory board) and the 
second model, advocated by the Italian, French and British 
delegates incorporating a single body mechanism, namely the 
board of directors. 
Furthermore, other amendments dealing with technical 
aspects were adopted. These amendments cover issues such as 
annual accounts, dismissal of auditors, representation 
rights, etc. Thus, according to the resolution, "this 
representation has the right to be regularly informed and 
consulted on the management, situation, development and 
future prospects of the company, its competitive position, 
its resource to credit and its investment progra mm e s".® ® 
Finally, the European Parliament, having accepted two 
amendments introduced by the German delegates SiegIerschmidt 
and Velter, declares that: 
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) "by constant and well-orientated evolution. Community 
policy must guarantee the workers of limited companies 
the right to exercise, by their participation in those 
companies' bodies, a real influence on the firm's 
decisions". 
"differences in political, historical and philosophical 
conceptions having prevented participation from 
developing along the same lines or to the same extent in 
all Member States, it is now necessary to create 
comparable legal conditions with a view to establishing 
this pa r t I c i pa t i on in the Member States".'*'^ 
Regarding information and consultation procedures, 
several directives have been issued, some of them have been 
adopted by the European Parliament and some still under 
discussion. The two most important directives which have 
been accepted and adopted by the Member States by voting for 
them, are the Vredeling Directive of Act 1982, and the 
Council Directive (amended) of July 1983. In the first one, 
although adopted, some changes have to be made and it deals 
mainly with voting procedures, size of companies, 
information and consultation procedures, etc. Without 
entering Into the various technical details, the amendments 
In brief are: 
Employees' representatives: "They shall be elected by 
secret ballot directly from the employees by the 
employees in each subsidiary undertaking 
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establ Ishment". 
Size of companies: "To be 
individual subsidiaries must 
and be part of a group which 
t he Commu nit y". 
covered by the Directive, 
employ at least 100 workers 
employs at least 1 000 i 
Information, Frequency and Scope: "Information 
provided at least once a year, rather than 
every six mo n t h s". 
should be 
at least 
The "bypass option": "Worker representatives may 
certain circumstances address themselves direct to 
management at corporate headquarters, but in writing. 
However, :f the company fails to meet Its obligations, 
workers’ representatives can take their company to the 
courts". 
Consultations: "To take place with workers in each 
concerned subsidiary". 
The latest proposal dealing with procedures for 
informing and consulting employees, was presented by the 
Commission in July 1983, and is an amendment of the original 
council directive presented on 24th October 1980. !* 
contains all the proposals mentioned in other directives, 
concerning information and consultation procedures with some 
additions and minor changes. The amended text is geared 
t owa rds workers' rights and tries to protect employee 
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Interests. 
The amended proposal provides for information procedures 
not only of general nature but of specific as well according 
to the particular sector of production, the geographical 
area, etc. Moreover, it provides for information on data, 
sales and employment, future investment prospects etc. All 
Information has to be given to the subsidiary from the 
mother company within 30 days, so that the employees 
concerned will be promptly informed. 
Consultation must take place before the final decision 
IS taken by the management of the enterprise, but the 
intention is not to impose co-determination rights. The 
C o mmission has also added to the list of consultation 
procedures, measures concerning the health and safety of 
employees, modifications on production methods and practices 
which result from the introduction of new technological 
methods. 
The Commission of European Communities aims to protect 
employee interests and thus give them a stronger and more 
influential voice in the decision-making process within 
European enterprises. For this purpose it published an 
amended proposal for a council directive on procedures for 
informing and consulting the employees of undertakings with 
complex structures, in particular trans-national 
undertakings: 
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"Whereas Council Directive 76/129/EEC of 17th February 
1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies and Council Directive 
77/ 1 87/EEC of 14th February 1 9 7 7 on the safe-guard i ng of 
employees' rights In the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of businesses incorporate compulsory 
procedures for informing and consulting the representatives 
of the employees affected by the operations in question, 
makes provision for worker participation;'*® 
Whereas steps should be taken to ensure that workers 
employed by a subsidiary in the Community are kept informed 
as to the activities and prospects of the parent undertaking 
and the subsidiaries as a whole so that they may assess the 
possible impact on their interests; whereas, to this end, 
the undertaking should be required to communicate to the 
employees' representatives both general information similar 
to that which must be disclosed under Directive 83/349/EEC 
but angled towards the interest of the employees. and 
information relating more specifically to these aspects of 
its activities and prospects which are liable to affect the 
employees' Interests;^^ 
Whereas appropriate penalties should be imposed by 
Member States in the event of failure to comply with the 
Information and consultation requirements provided by this 
directive; has adopted this Directive.'*‘*® 
Although European Commission directives cannot be 
enforced, they express the desire of the Commission, and 
having been adopted by the Member States the power to 
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enforce them is left to the individual Member States. 
Both the 1983 Council Directive and the 1982 amended 
Fifth Directive, form a step forward towards employee 
participation on the supervisory board of European 
companies. The adoption of the Fifth Directive by the Member 
States will legally bind all enterprises within the 
Commu nity boundaries to establish workers' participation 
within the undertaking, an act which will undoubtedly 
amplify in the long run employee influence 
decision-ma king. 
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Conclusions 
On the basis of the preceeding analysis, we may conclude 
that since the early days of the twentieth century, Europe 
pionneered the field of employee participation in management 
and that, after World War II the efforts increased in almost 
every European country, because of the need for concerted 
efforts to reconstruct their industries. Governments, trade 
unions, and employers' organisations contributed to the 
establishment of tripartite bodies and co-operated Ithe 
efforts to rebuild their industrial infrastructure. 
Trade union attitudes played a key role as they 
recognized the necessity for close co-operation with 
government and management In the endeavour to restore 
industrial production to pre-war levels and even achieve 
higher rates of productivity, which became a priority for 
the European economies. Furthermore, the acceptance by both 
employees and management that their mutual interests 
coincided in this case Cexcluding the occasional 
disagreements) contributed to the acceptance of each other 
as equal social partners. 
There has been some criticism inside the European 
Community about the proposed adoption of ~ common 
participatory system of management, and scepticism 
concerning the contribution that worker's participation can 
make to the reduction of conflict and the improvement of 
productivity performance. 
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Some trade unions have expressed fears that the 
institutionalisation of employee participation 
decision-making bodies will diminish the influence exerted 
by unions on the employees participating in such bodies, and 
consequently limit their effectiveness as representative 
organisation of workers. On the other hand, some industrial 
financial and commercial interests are also opposed to high 
level of participation and are afraid that co-decisions may 
have adverse effects on the long term viability, primarily 
of private owned enterprises. Certain employer 
associations, for instance, may fear that the efficiency and 
economic strength of their enterprises may be reduced as 
employee participation would give employee representatives 
the power to block the implementation of certain important 
Investment decisions. 
Nevertheless, there Is clearly a trend towards greater 
employee participation in the decision-making bodies of 
enterprises, and this cannot be ignored by any interested 
party. 
Firstly, it appears that the introduction of a system of 
employee participation in the European Community would not 
adversely affect other forms of participation which already 
exist in certain Member States. A minimum requirement would 
ensure employee participation within the Community without 
affecting the Member States’ policies which have more 
advanced forms of participation. By complementing other 
available institutions such as collective bargaining, or 
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representat I ve 
par t icipat ion 
contribute to 
amo u n t and 
improving the 
one is likely 
bargaining. 
tripartite institutions, employee 
on company decision working boards may 
more effective operations. By increasing the 
quality of information available, and by 
education and understanding of those affected, 
to have a positive effect on collective 
Participation in the decision-making body of an 
enterprise will give employees the opportunity to 
participate generally in decisions of an economic nature 
such as programmes of expansion or contraction. 
Furthermore, through participation, employees are given the 
opportunity to be involved on a permanent basis in the 
process of strategic decision making at the highest level of 
the enterprise. There is a clear distinction here between 
this form of participation and collective bargaining, the 
latter being bargaining at arm's length which tends to have 
more limited preoccupations and perspectives. 
There is a strong argument that employee participation 
at the board level will have adverse effects on industrial 
efficiency, and thus companies will have less ability to 
attract investment. It is argued that such a representation 
will concentrate more on securing jobs and existing 
structures, rather than improvements in efficiency which can 
attract investment. However, if one takes a look at the 
existing situation in different Member States and compares 
their general economic situation, it could not be concluded 
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that there is low efficiency, inadequate investment and 
limited profits in those countries which have developed 
fairly advanced forms of employee participation. On the 
contrary, the situation of low efficiency and inadequate 
investment prevail in industrial relations systems where 
there is no employee participation and a high degree of 
industrial conflict. Therefore, the probability of social 
confrontation due to the absence of employee par t i c i p a t ion 
is higher, and a greater threat to efficiency and investment 
rather than the existence of a participatory system of 
management. One, of course, cannot convincingly argue that 
the introduction of * participatory system in the 
supervisory bodies of enterprises will instantly solve the 
problems of industrial conflict and low productivity. The 
experience gathered by the operation of existing 
participatory systems In Western Europe suggests that as 
part of a programme which also includes effective tripartite 
representative institutions, and promotes the development of 
collective bargaining, they can make an immense contribution 
to improve industrial relations by eliminating unnecessary 
confrontations, and resolving those differences which do 
occur in a modern industrial society. Systems of employee 
participation such as the West German CFRG) or the Dutch 
system, offer a useful basis for Community legislation which 
seeks to establish c ommo n structures t owa r d s r. mo r e 
integrated democratic society where employees and managers 
can influence the decision-making of the industrial and 
commercial enterprises. In turn, these play a very 
important role in the economic performance of the Community 
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and the well-being of its citizens. 
Finally, as the record shows, the trade unions continue 
to play an important role in the economic decision-making at 
all levels within the European Economic Commu ni t y. 
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